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1 Introduction 
Corruption increasingly portrayed as a major threat to democracy, hindering both economic 
development and democratic consolidation (Seligson 2002; Ruhl 2011). It is argued that, by 
breaking the fundamental democratic principles of equality, openness, fairness, and 
accountability, corruption undermines the basis upon which the legitimacy of democracy rests 
(Warren 2004). The empirical evidence supporting such claims is, however, weak and open to 
crucial challenges. Most research undertaken on the relationship between corruption and 
democracy are aggregate-level studies that rely on highly subjective corruption perception 
indices in order to capture the various levels of corruption in different countries. The 
limitation to such an approach is that it is blind to the myriad of processes at the individual 
level that shape citizens‟ subjective perceptions of corruption and democracy. When we want 
to study the effects that corruption has on democratic legitimacy, this is a serious omission.  
If we are interested in explaining or studying the relationship between corruption and 
democratic legitimacy, it is necessary to move from the aggregate to the individual level of 
analysis, as this makes it possible to investigate both the consequences that corruption has on 
the level of political support for democracy, as well as the determinants of individuals‟ 
perceptions of corruption and their participation in corruption.  Individual-level studies of 
corruption and democracy have to some extent shown that corruption perceptions and 
corruption experiences weaken citizen support for and trust in democratic institutions. 
However, few studies have attempted to explore this relationship systematically; most 
existing studies are case studies, comparative analyses with a limited number of countries, or 
analyses of corruption based on a single measurement, such as the above mentioned indices. 
The thesis aims at contributing to the extant research literature on corruption and democratic 
legitimacy by providing a systematic, multilevel analysis of the effects that both individual 
corruption perceptions and experiences have on democratic legitimacy in 23 Latin American 
countries. More specifically, I explore whether or not individual corruption perceptions and 
experiences influence citizens‟ trust in public institutions, their satisfaction with democracy, 
and their normative support for democracy as a political system. The employment of 
multilevel analytical techniques makes it possible to examine how different relationships 
between corruption and democracy at the individual level are contingent on contextual 
variations between the 23 countries included in the study. 
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In this chapter, the concepts of corruption and democratic legitimacy are defined and 
discussed, along with a theoretical discussion of the relationship between corruption and 
legitimacy. Then, I give a brief review of existing research on corruption and democracy, 
followed by a discussion of the limitations and challenges to existing research. Finally, I make 
two main theoretical arguments on the link between corruption and democracy. Both 
arguments conclude with the formulation of research questions that will be shed light on in 
the subsequent chapters.   
In Chapter 2, I operationalize concepts, describe the data and methods used, and discuss for 
some concerns about data validity and reliability. In Chapter 3, I briefly describe the current 
status of corruption in the Latin American region by means of bivariate analysis, comparing 
various indicators of corruption at the macro- and micro-level, and discuss the validity and 
reliability of the different corruption indicators utilized in the study. Chapter 4 presents the 
three separate multilevel analyses of corruption‟s effect on three dimensions of legitimacy: 
institutional trust, satisfaction with democracy, and the normative support for democracy. In 
each analysis, I explore moderating effects of two contextual characteristics of the countries: 
level of corruption and institutional performance. Finally, in Chapter 5, the results and their 
implications are discussed.  
1.1 Defining Corruption 
The concept of corruption is a widely contested concept in social science, and thus lacks a 
precise and commonly accepted definition. Joseph S. Nye‟s (1967) classical definition 
described corruption as behavior that deviates from the normal duties of public office in order 
to pursue personal, pecuniary or status gains (Nye 1967, 66). Nye‟s definition can be 
classified as public-office-centred corruption, since it relates the act of corruption to 
deviations from the norms and duties that govern public office and public officials 
(Heidenheimer and Johnston 2002, 7). Public-office-centred
1
 definitions of corruption are the 
ones most commonly applied in social science, although several scholars use less specific 
ones such as “the misuse of public office for private gain” (Anderson and Tverdova 2003, 92; 
                                                 
1
 Heidenheimer and Johnston (2002) account for two other categories used for defining corruption, namely 
corruption with market-centred and public-opinion-centred qualities. These will not be accounted for here, as it 
is corruption by public officials and corruption in public administration services that constitute the primary focus 
of the thesis. For detailed discussions of corruption definitions and definitional criteria, see Gardiner (2002), 
Kurer (2005), or  Philp (2002, 2006) . 
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Canache and Allison 2005; Treisman 2007), “the abuse of public power for private benefit” 
(Canache and Allison 2005, 91; Tanzi 1998, 564), or other similar variants.  
There are two main difficulties in defining corruption. The first difficulty arises when giving 
specific content to the “normal duties” or established standards of public office. The second 
difficulty lies in trying to achieve a definition of corruption that is portable across different 
countries with different cultural contexts. As for defining the established standards of public 
office, scholars have suggested various criteria by which such standards may be based: 
formal-legal norms (an act is corrupt only if the law defines it as such), public opinion (an act 
is corrupt if the public sees it as corrupt), and public interest (an act is corrupt if it harms the 
public interest) (Gardiner 2002; Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000). Each criterion introduces new 
definitional problems, however. What is illegal and corrupt according to the laws established 
in one country may be an accepted practice in another. And, even if an act in one country is 
illegal, it may be viewed as ethically acceptable by both citizens and public officials. 
Furthermore, defining corruption out from what public opinion sees as corrupt or not corrupt 
brings up questions about who the public is, and to which opinion one should ascribe more 
value to when opinions diverge. Similar problems are introduced when defining corruption 
out from a public interest criterion, as it presupposes an agreement over what constitutes the 
public interest (Kurer 2005, 222).   
According to Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000), disputes over different definitional criteria 
overlook the actual existence of a clear definition of corruption, one based on the following 
three statements: First, Nye‟s (1967) classical definition describes corruption as breaking 
down the important distinction between the public and the private sphere. Second, corrupt 
acts undoubtedly involve an exchange where one party offers inducements (monetary or 
other) to or is solicited inducements from a public official in exchange for administrative 
advantages or “political goods.” Third, these kinds of exchanges are improper in that they 
violate established norms. Corruption is “the improper use of public office in exchange for 
private gain” (Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000, 34-35). The problem still remains, however, of 
giving these “established norms” specific content in a way that makes the definition of 
corruption portable across different countries and contexts, and permits comparative analysis. 
Before discussing the possible solutions to this problem, it may be useful to look at some of 
the acts commonly defined as, or associated with, corruption.   
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In research on corruption it is common to distinguish between political (high-level, “grand”) 
and bureaucratic (low-level, “petty”) corruption. Political corruption refers to situations 
where politicians, ministers and top officials exploit their positions for some personal gain, 
while bureaucratic corruption refers to corruption by public officials and officers working in 
public administration services (Andvig and Fjeldstad 2001). It follows from this that the 
actors involved in corrupt transactions at the political level are different from the actors 
involved at the bureaucratic level. High-level corruption will involve political and business 
elites, both international and national, whereas low-level corruption involves low-level public 
officials and average citizens. 
The act most commonly associated with corruption is bribery – i.e. the exchange of money, 
property, or other “goods” for a “publicly controlled good” (Bailey 2009, 63). Bribery should, 
according to Andvig and Fjeldstad (2001), be considered the essence of corruption. Other 
forms of corruption, which Bailey (2009, 63) labels political transactions, involve situations 
where public officials violate their duties by exchanging a public good for a resource that 
benefits his or her own power or influence.  Examples of such conduct are found when a civil 
servant gives a position to a relative or friend rather than to a better-qualified applicant 
(nepotism), when the winning political party removes all office-holders who supported the 
opposition (patronage), when a legislator votes for a bill that gives tax concessions to a 
company in which she herself owns stock (legislative conflict of interest), when government 
bureaucrats use their knowledge and contacts to establish consulting firms which give advice 
to private clients (bureaucratic conflict of interest), and when government contracts are 
awarded to favored friends or political supporters. Political transactions also include lying to 
the media and a handful of campaign financing methods (Gardiner 2002, 27). The kinds of 
behavior listed here are more or less commonly regarded as corrupt behavior according to 
broadly shared Western standards (Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000, 35), which are also the main 
point of reference for the majority of Latin American experience (Bailey 2009). Nonetheless, 
this brings us back to the question about the extent to which these standards give rise to 
definitions of corruption that are portable from one context to another. 
As is argued by Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000), the solution to the problem of the making 
corruption definitions portable across countries is to specify which definition of “improper” is 
employed in the analysis, and to apply this definition to the examination of different contexts 
(Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000, 35). I choose to define corruption as “the improper use of 
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public office in exchange for private gain,” where improper use includes the acts listed above. 
Defining corruption out from what different societies or different groups within societies 
consider it to be does not permit comparative analysis and, as everything becomes relative, it 
is an approach of little analytical value. This does not mean that it is not assumed that there 
may be cultural and individual variations in the definitions of what constitutes a corrupt act 
and in the toleration of such acts. But, if we want to study the effects of corruption across 
different countries with different contexts, it is necessary to treat it as an analytical category, 
and examine variations in the effects of it by analysis of public opinion.     
But what is all this fuzz around corruption really about? Is it at all important for the 
legitimacy of a democracy if some public officials and politicians are corrupt or not? Below, 
the concept of democratic legitimacy is defined and discussed, followed by an attempt at 
linking the two concepts and discussing the possible effects of corruption in a democratic 
context.  
1.2 Democratic Legitimacy 
The concept of legitimacy is a “bedrock concept” within political science (Booth and Seligson 
2009, 1). Modern legitimacy theory originated with Max Weber (1965), when he 
distinguished between traditional, charismatic, and legal forms of state legitimacy, and 
argued that the traditional and charismatic forms were unstable ones that would eventually 
evolve into the legal form dominated by a state bureaucracy (Booth and Seligson 2009, 1). 
Linking the legitimacy concept to democratic regimes, Seymour Martin Lipset (1981) argued 
that the stability of a democracy depends on economic development, effectiveness, and the 
legitimacy of its political system. Lipset (1981) contended that legitimacy involved the 
“capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political 
institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society” (Lipset 1981, 64). Legitimacy, he 
argued, was evaluative in the sense that “groups regard a political system as legitimate or 
illegitimate according to the way in which its values fit with theirs” (Lipset 1981, 64). He 
further argued that legitimacy played an important role in political stability, contending that 
highly legitimate but inefficient systems were more stable than highly efficient but 
illegitimate ones. However, prolonged effectiveness, such as sustained economic development 
over a long period of time, may give legitimacy to a political system (Lipset 1981, 64). 
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David Easton‟s (1965, 1965; 1975) framework of political support has become an important 
point of reference for some of the more recent research on public opinion and legitimacy. 
When reassessing the concept of political support, Easton (1975) distinguished between 
diffuse and specific forms of political support, as two forms of political system legitimization. 
The specific form of political support involves support for the political authorities and 
incumbent government on the basis of (i) the meeting of citizens‟ demands and/or (ii) the 
government‟s general performance, while diffuse support refers to evaluations of what an 
object (political authorities) represents (e.g. democracy) (Easton 1975, 444).  The distinction 
is important because it emphasizes the fact that citizens may disagree with the policies and 
outputs of incumbent governments while at the same time those same citizens may continue 
to support the political system per se. Because dissatisfaction with incumbent governments 
and political authorities can be resolved by “throwing the rascals out,” diffuse support is 
according to Easton (1975, 444-45) more or less independent of  short-term outputs and 
performance. However, Easton  (1975, 445) stresses that prolonged discontent with the 
perceived performance of governments may gradually erode diffuse support.  
When refining Easton‟s framework, Norris (1999) distinguished between five levels of 
political support, or “legitimizing targets”: political community (sense of belonging to a 
nation), regime principles (support for democracy as an ideal form of government), regime 
performance (current performance of the democratic regime), regime institutions (the 
functioning of democratic institutions), and political actors (incumbent government, political 
authorities) (Norris 1999, 10). When placed on a continuum, these levels may be seen as 
ranging from diffuse support (political community) to specific support (political actors). Thus, 
democracy‟s total legitimacy depends on citizens‟ support for each of these dimensions. 
Individual need not, however, be equally supportive of each of these dimensions, and 
countries will have varying contours of legitimacy based on the mean position their respective 
citizens take in each dimension (Booth and Seligson 2009, 10).  
The distinction between different types of diffuse and specific political support is crucial for 
understanding the relationship between the various levels of support and the eventual 
consequences that a lack of public support for one or more of the dimensions has on the 
political system.  
Starting at the most specific level, citizen support for an incumbent government and political 
actors is obviously connected to individual political affiliation. If there is widespread 
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discontent with the incumbent government in a democracy, citizens can simply use their 
democratic rights and freedoms to throw the government out and replace it with a new and, 
hopefully, more satisfactory one. Such an outcome would merely be evidence of a well-
functioning democracy with an active and engaged citizenry. Hence, discontent with the 
incumbent government and the authorities does not necessarily represent a threat to 
democracy‟s survival and consolidation.  
At the same time, Easton (1975) argued that prolonged discontent with successive 
governments and administrations may lead to a lack of more diffuse political support and 
trust. Diffuse support is, in turn, viewed as crucial for the consolidation and survival of 
democratic regimes. It is believed that trust in and support for democratic institutions 
facilitate the democratization process, and that a decline in diffuse support may eventually 
lead to a lack of support for democracy as a political system and increase the risk that citizens 
will support alternative forms of government (Anderson and Tverdova 2003). In other words, 
if citizens are dissatisfied with the functioning of democratic institutions and democracy‟s 
general performance, this can, in the long run, lead to a decreased normative support for 
democracy.  
The relationship between support for regime institutions, satisfaction with regime 
performance and support for regime principles is, however, not that simple. The 
dissatisfaction that citizens might have with the general performance of democracy does not 
necessarily mean they are undemocratic. Citizens may adhere to democratic norms and values 
and believe that, overall, democracy is the best system of governance, while at the same time 
they might negatively evaluate the functioning of this same system in their country at a 
particular point in time. Dissatisfied democrats are probably found in all democratic 
countries, regardless of how “liberal” or consolidated the democratic regime might be. 
Nevertheless, in new democracies, where some citizens have experienced the transition from 
authoritarian government to democracy and others have grown up in a partially democratized 
country, the conceptions of democracy may to a greater degree vary, and the distinctions 
between democracy‟s performance and democracy‟s fundamental principles may be less 
clear. If this is the case, citizen may support those alternative forms of government that they 
see as performing better in political and economic terms, even if this means giving up 
fundamental democratic rights.  
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Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that the different levels of legitimacy may be based on 
different sources. The determinants of support for incumbent governments or trust in 
institutions need not be the same as the determinants of support for regime principles and 
political community. Moreover, decreased or increased support for one dimension may 
decrease or increase support for another dimension. Having established this, the question that 
remains is how corruption relates to democracy, both at a general theoretical level, and in the 
eyes and minds of citizens. The following section attempts to link the concepts of corruption 
and democratic legitimacy together.  
1.3 A Clash with Democratic Principles 
The signature characteristic of democracy is the government‟s responsiveness to the 
preferences of its citizens, ones considered to be political equals. Citizens must have equal 
opportunities to formulate their preferences, to signify these to their fellow citizens and the 
government, and to have their preferences weighted equally, with no discrimination based on 
content or source (Dahl 1971, 1-2). Government officials are entrusted by the public to ensure 
that democratic processes are fair, and it is precisely those notions of citizen equality and 
institutional fairness that are compromised by corruption (Chang and Chu 2006, 260). 
If public agencies of collective action are reduced to instruments of private benefit, the 
effective domain of public action becomes reduced, which in turn reduces the reach of 
democracy  (Warren 2004, 330). The principles of honesty and fairness in the provision of 
public services, to which every citizen is entitled, are broken when the quality or delivery of 
government services depends on whether or not citizens are able to pay the extra amount of 
money required to satisfy the private interests of public officials. Likewise, democratic 
procedures are distorted where policies are born out those “back-alley deals” that often 
accompany financial scandals and electoral manipulation (Canache and Allison 2005, 91). 
It is not difficult to agree on that corruption represents a clash with democratic principles of 
fairness, equality, accountability, etc. This is often the point of departure for many scholars 
studying the corrosive effects that corruption has for democracy and democratic legitimacy 
(cf. Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Canache and Allison 2005; Chang and Chu 2006). But so 
what? Do citizens really care if some bribes are paid and some politicians are dishonest? Why 
should corruption matter for democratic legitimacy? 
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1.3.1 A Source of Legitimacy? 
When explaining the sources of legitimacy, a distinction can be made between the theoretical 
approach based on institutional performance versus the approach based on culture. The 
performance-based approach postulates that trust in and support for democracy are 
consequences of democracy‟s political and economic performance (Booth and Seligson 2009; 
Mishler and Rose 2001). This approach argues that (i) political trust and support is politically 
endogenous, i.e. a consequence rather than a cause of political and economic performance; 
and (ii) insofar as cultural values and early-life socialization influences individual political 
trust and support, more proximate evaluations of and experiences with regime performance 
are more important when citizens evaluate their support for democracy and its institutions 
(Mishler and Rose 2001). Thus, democratic legitimacy hinges on citizen evaluations of and 
experiences with the performance of democracy in political and economic terms. 
Citizen evaluations of government performance may, according to Miller and Listhaug (1999, 
205), be based on either direct (objective) performance, or on citizens‟ expectations of 
government. Recognizing the diffuseness of “expectations,” Miller and Listhaug (1999, 206) 
mention four types of expectations that citizens may compare government performance to: 
expectations with respect to the past, to the future, to an ideal of what is fair, or to what 
specific groups in society are perceived to gain from government outputs. Regardless of what 
type of expectation citizens have toward government and democracy, the main hypothesis is 
that political trust in and support for democratic government will decrease if government 
performance falls short of citizen expectations (Miller and Listhaug 1999, 206).  
The level of corruption in a democracy can be taken as an indicator of the regime‟s political 
performance. If we accept the claim that government performance (political as well as 
economic) is important for citizen evaluations of and support for government, we could 
assume that citizens who perceive high levels of corruption or experience a corrupt 
bureaucracy, will exhibit lower levels of political trust and support than citizens perceiving 
and experiencing the system to be fair and honest. But is it all that simple? 
According to the cultural approach, proximate evaluations of political and economic 
performance can play a small role in determining citizens‟ attitudes toward democracy, but 
these evaluations are not as important as individual early-life socialization experiences and 
the cultural norms prevalent in society (Eckstein 1988). While performance-based theories 
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postulate that government performance in curbing corruption, for example, will have a 
positive influence on citizens‟ political support, the cultural approach argues that cultural 
influences are deeper, and that evaluations of political or economic performance will be 
contingent on the political culture of the country. In countries with a “culture of corruption,” 
i.e. where corruption is more widespread and widely accepted, perceptions of corruption may 
be less salient and have weaker effects on both institutional trust and popular support for the 
regime compared to countries where corruption is less culturally ingrained (Mishler and Rose 
2005, 1054). 
In Latin America, this argument is an interesting one. The region is “known” for its 
presumably high levels of corruption, and several countries have been haunted by corruption 
scandals involving sitting presidents ever since the transitions to democracy (Morris and 
Blake 2009, 1). But corruption is neither new nor unique to the democratic governments 
imposed after the “third wave of democratization,” to which the majority of the Latin 
American countries pertain. Referring to historical analyses undertaken in several countries in 
the region, Morris and Blake conclude that it is, in the Latin American region, “abundantly 
clear that corruption predates the emergence of democracy” (Morris and Blake 2009, 3). 
Corrupt practices have clearly existed in the region long before democracy was imposed. 
However, Weyland (1998) suggests that corruption levels in the region have increased as a 
result of democratization processes. I argue that this suggestion, in itself, is problematic. 
Assessing whether or not the level of corruption has increased or decreased within a society is 
extremely possible to assess empirically. Nevertheless, this might be perceived to be the case 
due to, for example, the media and free press exposing corrupt practices in incumbent 
governments and among central politicians. 
Corruption may be entrenched in Latin American societies, and this is not necessarily the 
result of democracy itself. But which consequences might the perceived increase in levels of 
corruption have for the legitimacy of democracy in the region? Is it reasonable to assume that 
Latin American “corruption traditions” moderate the eventual negative effects of corruption 
on legitimacy? Could corruption be the prevailing norm in the Latin American region?  
Mungiu-Pippidi (2006) contends that in individualistic societies, such as liberal democracies 
based on the norm of universalism, individuals expect equal treatment from the state. By 
contrast, in societies based on the norm of particularism, such treatment depends on 
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individual status and position in society, and citizens may not expect fair treatment from the 
state, only similar treatment to everybody with the same status and position (Mungiu-Pippidi 
2006). The argument in relation to corruption is that the demise of particularism and 
traditional authority leads to intermediate regimes (“competitive particularism”), where 
corruption explodes. Corruption is, however, no longer an accepted social norm because 
popular expectations of the regime changes once the traditional regime is gone (Mungiu-
Pippidi 2006, 88-89).  
In the Latin American context this may be a more reasonable theoretical assumption than the 
cultural “more corruption, more acceptance” hypothesis. Obviously, a necessary condition for 
corruption to flourish in a society is that citizens, public officials, and politicians are willing 
to engage in corrupt transactions. If corruption is rampant at both the bureaucratic and 
political levels of politics, this means that politicians and public officials are inclined to 
engage in corrupt behavior, even if it conflicts with democratic norms and/or formal laws. 
However, the fact that a substantial number of government officials and politicians are willing 
to circumvent formal laws or procedures for their own private gain, does not necessarily 
imply that such behavior is automatically accepted by the general public, and it certainly does 
not mean that citizens necessarily accept corruption as a natural part of a sound and well-
functioning democratic system. 
In conjunction with the democratic transitions throughout Latin America, popular 
expectations toward the political system have changed also. I argue that it is plausible to 
assume that citizens of democratic or democratizing regimes expect equal treatment, 
procedural fairness, and accountability and transparency from their political leaders and the 
political system as a whole. Corrupt behavior from public officials and high-level authorities 
clearly violates these principles, and, if citizens perceive or experience corruption among 
public officials, this may negatively influence their views of democracy, thus affecting the 
legitimacy of the same system. 
However, differential effects of corruption can be explained within an institutional framework 
that focuses on the impact the political and economic performance of democratizing regimes 
has on citizen attitudes and expectations towards that same regime. It is plausible to expect 
that, as the political and economic performance of a democracy improves, citizen expectations 
toward democracy are heightened. Democratic institutions that perform relatively well will 
probably enjoy popular support. At the same time, citizen expectations of the system, in terms 
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of equal treatment and procedural fairness, may heighten. Connecting this to corruption, it is 
plausible to expect that citizens that experience corruption in countries where institutions are 
well-functioning will react more strongly to this because it to a stronger extent violates more 
or less established standards of public conduct.  
In contrast, in countries were institutions generally perform poorly, democratic institutions 
presumable will not enjoy high levels of popular support, and citizen expectations of equal 
treatment and procedural fairness may be thereafter. Thus, experiencing corruption within 
public administration systems may not come as a big surprise, and maybe not alter citizen 
attitudes toward institutions to the same degree as the former example. However, this need not 
indicate that corruption is the accepted norm, as the cultural argument holds.  
At the same time, in countries where institutions are performing poorly, the combating of 
corruption (or at least, the perception of the extent to which it is combated), may be a more 
important source of legitimacy than in countries where institutional performance is at a 
relatively high level. It is exactly these types of dynamics that the thesis is set out to uncover. 
In the next section, I describe some of the existing empirical contributions to research on 
corruption and democracy, and clarify the contribution the thesis makes to existing research 
on the field. 
1.4 Existing Empirical Research on Corruption 
Research on corruption regained academic interest after the end of the Cold War in 1989. The 
existing body of research on corruption and democracy can be differentiated according to two 
important dimensions: (i) the level of analysis and (ii) the assumed direction of causality. 
Aggregate-level research tends to study the effects that democracy and different political 
institutions have on corruption levels, while individual-level research most commonly 
explores the effects that corruption has on support for democratic government and 
institutions. In the following, I give a brief review of key studies of corruption and 
democracy, at both the aggregate and individual levels.  
1.4.1 Aggregate level research 
Economic Growth and Inequality 
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The most robust relationship found in research on corruption is the negative correlation 
between corruption and economic development. The levels of perceived corruption tend to be 
lower when a country‟s level of economic development is higher, a finding that has survived a 
variety of controls
 2
 (Treisman 2007, 223, 225) Mauro‟s pioneering study (1995) on 
corruption and economic growth found that corruption decreased economic growth by 
weakening investment. Svensson (2005) finds corruption levels to be strongly related to GDP 
per capita and human capital,
3
 but does not find a significant relationship between economic 
growth and corruption. You and Khagram (2005) find income inequality to be an equally 
important determinant of corruption levels when compared to the influence of economic 
development, and show that the effect of inequality on corruption levels is stronger in more 
democratic countries (You and Khagram 2005, 153). In addition, corruption has been linked 
to trade openness, government expenditures, and foreign aid. For more detailed reviews of 
this literature, see Lambsdorff (1999) and Treisman (2007). 
Democracy  
A key study within aggregate research on the relationship between corruption and democracy 
is Treisman‟s 2000 study which examines, among other factors, the effect that democracy has 
on levels of perceived corruption in 85 countries. Treisman (2000) found democracy to have 
significant effects on the perceived level of corruption, but only after 40 years of 
uninterrupted democracy, indicating a “painfully slow process by which democracy 
undermines the foundations of corruption” (Treisman 2000, 439). Sung (2004, 187), 
corroborates Treisman‟s results, finding democratization to generally, and eventually decrease 
corruption levels.  
Sung (2004, 187) argues that it is reasonable to expect temporary upsurges in government 
corruption during the early stages of the political liberalization process. In line with this 
argument, Montinola and Jackman (2002) find a nonlinear relationship between corruption 
and democracy, reporting that corruption tends to be lower in authoritarian regimes versus 
partially democratised ones, but once passing a threshold, democracy inhibits corruption. 
When re-examining this link, Treisman (2007) finds support for the same claim: perceived 
                                                 
2
 These controls include ethnolinguistic fractionalisation, latitude, region, religion, culture, democracy, trade, 
inequality, inflation, and various policy variables (Treisman 2007, 225). 
3
 Human capital is measured by years of schooling among the total population above the age of 25 (Svensson 
2005, 27). 
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corruption decreases when democracy increases from 2 to 1 or 7 to 6 on the Freedom House 
scale, while effects of movements between 6 and 3 are more erratic (2007, 228). This suggests 
that increases in freedom and level of democracy do not necessarily have significant impacts 
on corruption levels among imperfect democracies or soft authoritarian states, which is 
consistent with Paldam‟s (1999) finding that corruption decreases with increasing levels of 
democracy, but that the covariance varies according to the different levels of democracy.  
The finding that long-term democratic rule is associated with lower levels of corruption is 
supported by Thacker (2009), Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000), and Goldsmith (1999). 
However, both Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) and Goldsmith (1999) find that the effects of 
democratic institutions and political rights are weaker than the economic factors accounted for 
in the analyses.  
Political Institutions 
Some scholars have explored the relationship between different political institutions and 
levels of perceived corruption. Gerring and Thacker (2004) explore the relationship between 
territorial sovereignty (unitary or federal) and the composition of the executive (parliamentary 
or presidential) versus levels of perceived corruption, concluding that unitary and 
parliamentary forms reduce corruption levels. This finding is supported by Lederman, 
Loayza, and Soares (2004), while Lindstedt and Naurin (2006) conclude that making political 
institutions more transparent effectively combats corruption. When re-examining the 
relationships between perceived corruption and some of the aforementioned factors, Treisman 
(2007, 231-35) finds that (i) levels of perceived corruption tend to decrease when political 
rights increase
4
, (ii) presidential systems are associated with higher levels of perceived 
corruption, and (iii) a free and widely read press lowers perceived levels of corruption. Less 
significant factors were the type of electoral system and fiscal and political decentralization 
(ibid.).  
1.4.2 Individual level research 
                                                 
4
 Significance varied depending on the measurement applied. Relationships were found to be significant when 
combining the World Bank‟s Control of Corruption measurements with the Freedom House (FH) ratings, but not 
so significant when combining Transparency International‟s (TI) Corruption Perception Index (CPI) with FH 
political rights scores, and only sometimes significant when analysing the WB data against the Polity IV 
democracy measurements (Treisman 2007, 231). 
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When compared to the amount of research on corruption and democracy at the aggregate 
level, far fewer studies have attempted to explore the same relationship at the individual level. 
Most existing studies at the individual level reverse the causal direction by examining the 
effects that perceptions of corruption have on social trust, political trust and support, and 
voting behavior. A few additional studies take a closer look into the determinants of 
perceptions of corruption, experiences with corruption, and participation in corruption.
5
 Here, 
I give a brief review of existing research on (i) corruption and political preferences, (ii) 
corruption and social trust, and (iii) the social and attitudinal determinants of corruption 
Political Preferences 
The most consistent finding in individual research on corruption and political preferences 
seems to be that perceptions of corruption weaken trust in institutions, trust in civil servants, 
and support for incumbent governments. Several studies find individual corruption 
perceptions to have a negative effect on trust in political institutions (Canache and Allison 
2005; Chang and Chu 2006; Morris 2008; Morris and Klesner 2010; Mishler and Rose 2005), 
and the same holds true for the few studies that explore the effects of corruption experiences 
(Morris 2008; Morris and Klesner 2010; Seligson 2002, 2006). 
As for the more specific types of political support, Anderson and Tverdova (2003) and 
Canache and Allison (2005) find perceptions of corruption to be negatively associated with 
trust in civil servants and support for incumbent governments. Manzetti and Wilson (2009) 
also found perceptions of corruption to decrease support for incumbent government, but that 
government disapproval was contingent on the effectiveness of the country‟s democratic 
institutions. Individuals who perceived higher levels of corruption were less likely to “punish” 
the government in countries where government effectiveness is low. When corruption 
perceptions were low, however, they found no significant impact from the effectiveness of 
institutions (Manzetti and Wilson 2009, 88). Individual perceptions of corruption have also 
been related to voting behavior and electoral outcomes. Results suggest that opposition 
partisans who perceive high levels of corruption in government are more likely to abstain 
                                                 
5
 I use the terms corruption “experience” and “participation” somewhat interchangeably, especially in this 
section. Corruption “experience” may refer to actual participation in corruption but also to the observation of 
corrupt acts. Corruption “participation” refers solely to the participation in corruption.   
6
 Other activities include acquiring public services through acquaintances; fast-tracking administrative processes 
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from voting rather than support opposition parties in subsequent elections (Davis, Camp, and 
Coleman 2004, 699; McCann and Domínguez 1998).  
The results are mixed with respect to the influence that individual experiences with and 
perceptions of corruption have on more diffuse types of political support. Anderson and 
Tverdova (2003) find perceptions of corruption to negatively affect evaluations of 
democracy‟s general performance in 16 countries, a finding supported by Morris (2008), who 
found both corruption perceptions and experiences to negatively affect citizens‟ satisfaction 
with democracy in Mexico. Results for both corruption experiences and perceptions fell, 
however, just short of being statistically significant (Morris 2008, 405). Rose, Mishler, and 
Haerpfer‟s (1998) cross-national study of nine Central and East European countries found 
corruption perceptions to be associated with lower levels of support for the regime, and a 
decreased likelihood for citizens to reject undemocratic alternatives. When controlling for 
alternative explanations of system support, however, the effects were substantially attenuated 
and/or reduced to insignificance (Anderson and Tverdova 2003, 93). The same insignificant 
relationship between corruption perceptions and normative support for democracy is found by 
Canache and Allison (2005), while Rose, Shin, and Munro (1999) found a significant and 
positive relationship. South Koreans that perceived levels of government corruption to be high 
were more supportive of democracy as an ideal form of government (Rose, Shin, and Munro 
1999, 156).  
Social Trust 
Results are somewhat mixed when it comes to the relationship between corruption and social 
trust. Seligson (2006) finds that individuals who have experienced corruption or have engaged 
in corrupt transactions tend to display lower levels of social (interpersonal) trust. Similarly, 
Morris (2008) argues that socially trusting individuals are less likely to engage in corrupt 
transactions. Hence, regardless of the causal direction assumed, individuals with higher levels 
of social trust tend to have less experience with corruption. As for perceptions of corruption 
and social trust, Morris (2008) finds a positive relationship between the two variables: As 
social trust increases, so do individual perceptions of corruption. This finding stands in clear 
contrast to the results found by Canache and Allison (2005) and Olken (2009), where 
increases in social trust are associated with decreases in perceptions of corruption. When 
studying the same relationship in Mexico, Morris and Klesner (2010, 1270) fail to find a 
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significant relationship between social trust and corruption experience or social trust and 
corruption perceptions. 
Social and Attitudinal Determinants of Corruption 
Another small body of research has explored some of the social and attitudinal determinants 
of perceptions of and participation in corruption. Gatti et al. (2003) examine the social 
determinants of corruption in 35 countries, finding that female, employed, less wealthy, and 
older citizens tend to be more averse to corruption. Blake (2009, 102-103) found confidence 
in the police to be associated with a lower tolerance of bribe-taking, and that women and 
older people were less tolerant of corruption than men and younger people. Income, life 
satisfaction, education and interpersonal trust were found to not have any significant impact 
on individual tolerance of corruption.  
When testing the extent to which social learning theory or individual levels of institutional 
and social trust better explained the propensity of public officials and individuals to 
participate in corruption in Estonia, Tavits (2005) found that decisions to participate were 
primarily influenced by a personal definition of corruption, and by perceptions of how 
widespread corrupt activities are. Individuals who did not define corruption (here, paying a 
bribe or other witnessed activities)
6
 as morally wrong, or perceived corruption to be 
widespread, were more inclined to engage in corrupt behavior. Individual levels of 
institutional and social trust could not explain the propensity of individuals to participate in 
corruption (Tavits 2005). As for the behavior of public officials towards citizens, Fried et al. 
(2010) conducted field experiments and qualitative interviews with police officers, and found 
that officers were more likely to solicit bribes from lower-class citizens while letting more 
wealthy individuals off with a warning after committing traffic violations. Interviews with 
police officers showed that the officers associated wealth with the capacity to exact 
punishment, and were, therefore, more likely to demand bribes from citizens they perceived to 
be poorer.    
1.4.3 Limitations and Challenges to Existing Research 
                                                 
6
 Other activities include acquiring public services through acquaintances; fast-tracking administrative processes 
through acquaintances with public officials; gift offering; public officials using information for their own private 
benefit; public officials doing favours in return for counter-favours; public officials making business contracts on 
behalf of their institution with companies owned by relatives; political parties passing resolutions favourable for 
a particular company in return for a donation from the company (Tavits 2005, 12). 
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After reviewing the previous research on corruption and democracy, it seems that there is a 
nonlinear relationship between corruption and democracy at the aggregate level. Several 
studies suggest that democracy inhibits corruption, but only after decades of democratic 
government. The results are mixed at the individual level, but most point in the direction of 
corruption as negatively affecting democratic legitimacy. Nonetheless, the relationship 
between corruption and democracy needs to be subjected to additional empirical scrutiny. 
This thesis contributes to the research literature in two main ways: First, in the thesis I 
disaggregate both the concept of corruption and the concept of democratic legitimacy, and 
examines the relationships between both corruption perceptions and corruption experiences 
with variations in levels of legitimacy. Second, the thesis combines macro- and micro-data on 
corruption and democracy, exploring the ways in which the relationships between corruption 
and democratic legitimacy at the individual level are contingent on contextual characteristics 
at the country level. 
I start with discussing some of the problems related to the measurement of corruption, and 
discuss to some extent the advantages and limitations to the existing ways of measuring 
corruption. Finally, I formulate the general research questions. 
Measuring a Secret Phenomenon 
Due to its sub rosa nature (Seligson 2006), corruption is an extremely difficult phenomenon 
to measure. Because of the secrecy of corruption, achieving a measurement that is both 
objective and systematic is almost impossible. “Hard” data - e.g. measuring corruption based 
on court rulings, press reports, and anti-corruption reports – do not provide us with a 
systematic measurement of corruption, nor can they function as good indications of a 
country‟s level of bureaucratic or political corruption.7 Such measurements have, therefore, 
not gained scholarly acceptance (Morris 2008). 
Among the accepted approaches to measuring corruption are subjective measurements of 
corruption perceptions and corruption experiences, or participation, whereof measurements 
of corruption perceptions are the most developed and most commonly employed. Most 
scholars rely on aggregate subjective indices such as Transparency International‟s (TI) 
                                                 
7
 As Morris (2008)  and Seligson (2006) point out, these kinds of sources are unreliable because they may be 
completely independent of a country‟s actual corruption level. In highly corrupt countries, efforts at reducing 
corruption may be fewer, and therefore, little corruption is reported. In “clean” countries, however, there may be 
arrests and convictions for even minor corrupt acts (Seligson 2006, 383). 
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Corruption Perception Index (CPI) or the World Bank‟s index of Control of Corruption. In 
public opinion research, scholars rely mostly on individual perceptions of how prevalent 
corruption is in their respective countries. In recent years, however, attempts at measuring 
corruption more “directly” by asking respondents about their actual experience with or 
participation in corrupt acts have been undertaken (Morris 2008; Morris and Klesner 2010; 
Seligson 2002, 2006). Each of these measurements has its own limitations, and I will consider 
these in turn. 
In assessing corruption levels in various countries, the CPI and WB indices rely on a range of 
different sources, including public opinion surveys, country experts, business leaders, 
expatriates, etc., and today are considered to be the best and most reliable ways of measuring 
corruption (Seligson 2006; Treisman 2007). Although relying on a variety of sources 
undoubtedly increases the reliability of these measurements, there are important limitations to 
each approach. The CPI, for example, compiles a “poll of polls” based on the perceptions of 
national and foreign business leaders and risk analysts working for multinational firms and 
institutions in each country, whose job entails taking into consideration the level of corruption 
in a country before deciding on whether and how much to invest in the country‟s market. 
Thus, the measurement is a result of informed elite-based surveys (Canache and Allison 2005, 
94-95; Seligson 2006, 384). The CPI may be good at evaluating business transactions, but is 
weak at tapping into other corrupt activities that may not be business related (Seligson 2006, 
385). It might also suffer from an endogeneity problem: The results may be strongly 
influenced by factors other than those directly observed by participants. Treisman (2007, 241) 
asks whether the CPI and WB indices actually measure corruption itself, or if they are guesses 
about its extent in particular countries, in accordance with conventional theories of corruption.  
Thus, aggregate corruption perception indices are of limited value if we want to study the 
ways in which corruption may affect democracy. Ultimately, the legitimacy of a democracy 
resides in the minds of its citizens. If we want to know more about the relationship between 
corruption and democracy, we need to study this relationship at the individual level. At the 
same time however, individual-level research also relies on individual perceptions of 
corruption. Individual perceptions about corruption may be more or less independent of the 
actual level or frequency of corruption. Nevertheless, individual perceptions are important 
because they influence individual attitudes and beliefs about society. 
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Still, relying solely on individual perceptions does not necessarily tell us more about 
corruption than do aggregate perception indices. Additionally, individual perceptions about 
corruption may be influenced by their views on democracy, i.e. an individual‟s perception of 
corruption can be the result of that individual‟s critical attitude towards how his or her 
democratic institutions function. Studying individual experiences with corruption can give a 
more nuanced picture of the frequency of corruption in public administrations, and brings us 
closer to the “fact” of corruption. The limitation to studying citizen experiences, however, is 
the inability of these experiences to tap into high-level political corruption. As Morris (2008) 
points out, high-level corruption may be impossible to measure. When tapping into high-level 
corruption, proxy measures, such as the aggregate corruption indices, are the best approach to 
date. 
1.4.4 The Thesis’ Contribution  
Thus, the main argument is that, in order for research on corruption and democracy to 
advance, we need to disaggregate our concepts and combine different measures of corruption. 
The thesis will contribute to existing research by employing a multilevel analysis of the 
effects that both corruption perceptions and corruption experiences have on various levels of 
democratic legitimacy in 23 countries in the Latin American region.   
To date, very few studies have examined the impact that both individual corruption 
perceptions and individual corruption experiences have on democratic legitimacy. There are 
some exceptions to this rule, but their weakness is that they are either case studies or they 
analyze a very limited number of countries.
8
 As for the concept of democratic legitimacy, 
disaggregation is a common practice. However, in studying corruption, most research has 
focused only on the legitimacy of regime institutions, i.e. the impact of corruption on trust in 
public institutions. The same dimension will be subject to investigation in the thesis, but I will 
argue that more research needs to be done on the relationship between corruption and the 
more diffuse types of political legitimacy, an approach that has been taken only to a limited 
extent.
9
 If we want to know more about the relationship between corruption and democracy, 
we need to examine the impact that corruption perceptions and experiences have on different 
                                                 
8
 Studies by Morris (2008) and Morris and Klesner (2010) focus solely on Mexico, while studies by Booth and 
Seligson (2009), Seligson (2006), and Seligson (2002) are limited to eight, six, and four Latin American 
countries, respectively.    
9
 See Booth and Seligson (2009), Morris (2008), Rose, Shin, and Munro (1999). 
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levels of legitimacy. This leads us to the first of two research questions to be answered: Do 
corruption perceptions and corruption experiences have different effects on democratic 
legitimacy? And, do the corruption perceptions and experiences have stronger effects on 
some legitimacy dimensions than others?  
Second, theory and empirical research suggests that the degree to which corruption 
perceptions and experiences influence democratic legitimacy may contingent on a country‟s 
level of political and economic development. More specifically, institutional theory suggests 
that the relationship between corruption and democracy at the individual level is contingent 
on the political performance of the regime in terms of institutional effectiveness and the like. 
If we want to know more about the differential effects of corruption on democratic legitimacy 
across countries, we need to combine individual-level data with country-level data. Studying 
individual and country-level variations simultaneously will bring us closer to knowing if and 
how individual-level effects are contingent on, or mediated by, country-level characteristics.
10
 
Thus, the final general research question of the thesis is: Do the individual-level effects of 
corruption on legitimacy vary across countries? If they do, can country-level traits such as 
institutional effectiveness and level of corruption explain some of this variation? 
 
                                                 
10
 Multilevel analytical techniques have been employed by Anderson and Tverdova (2003) and Booth and 
Seligson (2009), but these study only corruption perceptions or one dimension of corruption experience.  
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2 Data and Method 
This chapter describes the data used and method applied in the data analyses presented in 
Chapter 3 and 4. The first section describes the individual-level and aggregate-level data, 
while the second section describes the statistical approach and methodological choices made 
in connections with the statistical analyses. The third section focuses on the 
operationalizations of key variables, and the measurement validity of these. In a final section, 
I consider the general reliability and validity of the study. 
2.1 Data 
Individual-level data were obtained from the Latin American Public Opinion Project‟s 
(LAPOP) AmericasBarometer survey from 2010. Units are voting-age adults in 23 countries 
in the Latin American region,
11
 which in the pooled data set yields a total number of 
observations of n=39238.  LAPOP makes use of multistage stratified-clustered sampling 
(STR-PSU). Countries were divided into regions, and regions were stratified by urban and 
rural areas. Within urban and rural areas the Primary Sampling Units (PSU), neighborhoods, 
were selected by the probability proportional to size (PPS) criteria. Households were 
randomly selected within PSUs and respondents selected after the “next birthday system.”12 
All single country data sets, except 6, are self-weighted,
13
 which makes it necessary to 
incorporate sample weights in the analysis. This is discussed in section 2.2.4. Individual 
country sample sizes are around n=1500, with some exceptions.
14
  
LAPOP was founded by Mitchell A. Seligson and is hosted by Vanderbilt University. The AB 
series was established by LAPOP 2004 and aims at covering all democratic countries in the 
Americas. The 2010 round is the fourth round in the AB series. LAPOP holds its surveys to 
very high standards of quality. Questionnaires are pre-tested in each country, and in 2010 
hand-held electronic systems were used in 17 out of 26 countries to eliminate data collection 
                                                 
11
 Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, The Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Perú, Suriname, 
Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
12
 For detailed accounts of the sampling procedures in each country, see Appendix A. 
13
A weight variable (wt) was created in all self-weighted datasets (wt=1) in order to be able to incorporate 
sampling weights when analyzing the data. The final dataset was survey set (svyset) in accordance with 
LAPOP‟s weighting recommendations (see 
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/AmericasBarometer_weighting_scheme_all_years_of_AB.pdf). 
14
 See Appendix C. 
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and processing errors (LAPOP 2010). LAPOP holds its surveys and studies to very standards 
of quality. Seligson and Zechmeister (2010, xviii) report a higher quality of data with fewer 
errors when employing electronic systems for data collection in 2010, compared to previous 
years. The 2010 study is the largest study of democratic values undertaken in the Americas 
(Seligson and Zechmeister 2010, xv). LAPOP cooperates with local organizations, and make 
use of bilingual interviewers who apply translated questionnaires in countries with significant 
indigenous-speaking populations. Detailed accounts of sampling procedures for each 
individual country are given in Appendix A.  
Aggregate-level data are obtained from Transparency International, the World Bank, and the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The use of macro-level data and 
operationaliztions of country-level predictors is discussed in section 2.3.3 
2.1.1 Countries included in the Study 
The 2010 AB survey included 26 countries in North America, Latin America, and the 
Caribbean. In the analysis, I included every country that (i) are defined as electoral 
democracies, and (ii) belongs to the Latin American or Caribbean region. USA and Canada 
were not included because they cannot be said to be a part of either Latin America or the 
Caribbean, and Haiti was excluded because it is not defined as an electoral democracy 
(FreedomHouse 2010). Including Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname and Trinidad & Tobago means 
taking on a broad definition of Latin America, as these countries are not conventionally 
defined as being part of the Latin American region. The term “Latin America” thus refers to 
countries in the Latin America and the Caribbean regions. Although the above mentioned 
countries are not conventionally defined as Latin American countries, this is in accordance 
with the U.S. definition of Latin America. The argument is that although these countries do 
not share the same Spanish and Portuguese colonial heritage, they belong to the same 
geographical region and face the same socioeconomic developmental challenges.  
2.2 Method 
The research questions of this thesis calls for a methodological approach that makes it 
possible to combine individual-level factors with aggregate-level factors. The analysis will 
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therefore be carried out making use of multilevel analytical techniques (multilevel models; 
MLM). 
When analyzing cross-national survey data with a relatively large number of countries, there 
are both substantial as well as statistical reasons for choosing MLM. Individuals included in 
the analysis undoubtedly belong to different countries with different cultures, and different 
political and economic trajectories. Individuals (Level-1 units) can thus be seen as nested 
within countries (Level-2 units), which indicates that we are dealing with hierarchically 
structured data (clustered data). It is further reasonable to assume that individuals belonging 
to the same group (in this case countries) share some of the same influences, which suggests 
that individuals that belong to the same country are presumably more similar to each other 
than to individuals belonging to other countries. This again, means that observations within 
one country not necessarily are independent (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 219). 
MLM recognizes the hierarchical structure of the data, and that such a structure may give rise 
to varying intercepts and slopes across countries (Bickel 2007). That is, the mean level of an 
outcome variable (Y) may vary considerably across countries, as well as the average effect of 
an independent variable X on Y may be different in country A compared to country B. Failing 
to recognize this structure leads to a violation of the independency assumption, which again 
can lead to incorrect estimates of standard errors and Type I errors. Estimating models using 
OLS regression analysis and including dummy variables to account for between-country 
variation would not correct for this (Steenbergen and Jones 2002). Moreover, regular OLS 
regression analysis precludes the inclusion of country-level predictors.  
Some of the substantive reasons for choosing multilevel analysis are precisely that MLM 
permits (i) inclusion of predictors at both levels of analysis in one single model, and (ii) 
analysis of whether the effects of individual-level predictors are contingent on or moderated 
by country-level predictors by specifying cross-level interactions. In addition, MLM can 
provide a test of the generalizability of the findings, given that the Level-2 units are randomly 
sampled (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 219). 
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2.2.1 The multilevel model 
Multilevel analysis combines the Level-1 model and the Level-2 model in one single 
comprehensive model. The Level-1 model with one Level-1 predictor can be written 
Yij = β0j +  β1j(Xij )+  rij  
where β0j is the intercept for country j,  β1j is the regression coefficient for country j and rij is 
the Level-1 residual. Two Level-2 models for the intercept and slopes are written 
β0j = γ00 + uoj   and β1j = γ10 + u1j 
which express each country‟s intercept and slope as a function of the mean intercept an slope, 
plus a residual term that captures country j’s deviation from the mean. The combined model 
with one Level-1 predictor and one Level-2 predictor can be written 
Yij = γ00 + γ10(Xij) + γ01(Xj) + uoj + u1j(Xij) + rij 
Giving the mean intercept and slope(s) (γ00 and γ10, respectively) across countries, the 
variance estimates for uoj and u1j that quantify the heterogeneity in the intercepts and slopes 
(τ00 and τ11), the covariance between the intercepts and slopes (τ10), and the Level 1 residual 
variance (σ2) (Enders and Tofighi 2007, 122-23). 
In the analyses, three different models are estimated. In the first model,
15
 the interecept is 
allowed to vary randomly across countries (Yij = γ00 + γ10(Xij) + uoj + rij), in the second model 
the regression slopes for certain Level-1 covariates are allowed to vary between countries (Yij 
= γ00 + γ10(Xij) + uoj + u1j + rij), and in the final model cross-level interactions between Level-2 
predictors and Level-1 predictors are included (Yij = γ00 + γ01(Xj) + γ10(Xij) + γ11(Xij)(Xj) + uoj 
+ u1j(Xij) + rii). 
Thus in the first model, only fixed effects
16
 of individual-level covariates are estimated, and 
the intercept is allowed to vary randomly. In the second model, key individual-level 
predictors are allowed to vary randomly across countries, and in the third model cross-level 
interactions are specified in order to examine whether country-level predictors explain 
variations in the effects of individual-level predictors across countries. 
                                                 
15
 Models 1-3 in Chapter 4. 
16
 The effects are assumed to be fixed, i.e., that X have the same effect on Y across all countries. 
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2.2.2 Assumptions  
The assumptions of linear multilevel models are at the individual-level identical to the 
assumptions of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. Random residuals are assumed to 
be independently distributed with uniform variance (residuals are not correlated and exhibit 
homoscedasticity) (Bickel 2007, 107). Residual diagnostics were performed as recommended 
by Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008, 125-26) for the random intercept model, and showed 
that the assumptions are satisfied in all three models (also checking for outliers).  
2.2.3 Centering of variables 
Centering decisions should be based on the substantial research questions of interest to the 
thesis, as recommended by Enders and Tofighi (2007, 122). All independent variables at 
Level 1 are centered by their group (country) means (centering-within-cluster (CWC)). 
Predictors at Level 2 are centered by their grand mean (CGM). CWC removes all between-
country variation and makes it possible to examine the “pure” estimate of the pooled within-
country regression coefficient. It also yields a more accurate estimate of the slope variance 
than CGM (Enders and Tofighi 2007, 128). CWC centering at the individual-level is the 
recommended approach when studying individual-level relationships and cross-level 
interactions between individual-level slopes and country-level predictors. Additionally it 
reduces the possibility of finding significant cross-level interaction effects when no such 
effects exist in the population (Enders and Tofighi 2007).  
2.2.4 Estimation methods and incorporation of weights 
Because LAPOP‟s sampling procedures include both stratification and clustering, individuals 
have unequal selection probabilities. In order to achieve results that are representative for the 
population, it is necessary to incorporate sampling weights when estimating models. As 
mentioned in section 2.1, six individual country data sets are not self-weighted. The only 
estimation method that makes it possible to include sampling weights for MLM in Stata is the 
GLLAMM package developed by Sofia Rabe-Hesketh and Anders Skrondal. Because 
GLLAMM is highly inefficient, it is not recommended that GLLAMM be used on linear 
models (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008, 100). 
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GLLAMM‟s inefficiency proved to be a problem when estimating random coefficient models 
and models with cross-level interactions. GLLAMM showed itself to be highly unstable when 
estimating such models, which in some cases resulted in unknown errors even after reassuring 
that the package was up to date.
17
 GLLAMM was too inefficient for the time restrictions of 
the thesis even after attempts to speed the estimation up after Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal‟s 
(2008, 263) recommendations. I therefore decided to present non-weighted results, using 
Stata‟s xtmixed command. GLLAMM estimates of the random intercept models are given in 
Appendix C. When estimating fixed effects models with GLLAMM, weights were scaled so 
that the new weights sum to the effective cluster size (Carle 2009). Because individual 
country sample sizes are for some countries larger than the majority of the countries, sample 
sizes were standardized to n=1500 for each country, and a combined weight was constructed.  
When interpreting the results in Chapter 4, I let the reader know if discrepancy is found 
between xtmixed and GLLAMM estimates of fixed effects.  
It is thus not possible to compare the un-weighted results presented for the random coefficient 
models and models with cross-level interactions with results where weights are incorporated. 
In order to examine potential bias caused by the un-weighted data, I excluded the six non-self-
weighted data sets and ran the same analyses on the remaining 17 countries.
18
 If any 
discrepancy is found it will not be certain whether this is the results of not incorporating 
weights or the result of excluding countries that contribute to variation in the dependent 
variable and the independent variables at Level 1 and 2.  
Fixed effects and variance components are estimated with restricted maximum-likelihood 
estimation (REML). When samples are large, maximum-likelihood (MLE) estimation and 
REML produce nearly equal results in large samples, but REML variance components 
estimates are according to Steenbergen and Jones (2002, 226) less biased than MLE variance 
components estimates in small samples of Level-2 units. 
 
 
                                                 
17
 This was not due to model misspecification, because estimating the same model that had previously resulted in 
error reports, sometimes did converge. The latter was, however, more frequently the case. 
18
 Including in these analyses only the country-level predictor found to explain individual-level variation. 
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2.2.5 Challenges and limitations to the application of MLM on cross-
national survey data 
In the following, I consider two main challenges to the use of multilevel analytical techniques 
on cross-national survey data. The first challenge concerns the limited number of Level-2 
units included in the analysis. In this case we have 23 units at the country level, which is a 
dangerously low level. According to Snijders and Bosker  (1999, 144),
19
 multilevel analysis is 
usually applicable when the number of Level-2 units ranges between 10 and 100. The larger 
the number the better, however, and the limitations and statistical problems encountered will 
be greater the lower the number of units. Having only 23 observations at the country-level 
imposes restrictions on the number of predictors that can possibly be included simultaneously. 
I have indicated that it is my intent to test the cross-level interactions between individual-level 
corruption indicators and the country-level predictors such as level of corruption and 
institutional quality. Due to multicollinearity, I cannot include both these predictors at once. I 
do, however, find it safe to include two country-level predictors when collinearity is not a 
problem, as the rule of thumb says at least 10 observations per explanatory variable (Strabac 
2007). Therefore, when estimating cross-level interactions, I control for economic 
development (GDP per capita PPP $1000).  
The second challenge to the analysis is that MLM assume that higher-level units too are 
randomly sampled (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 219). In a cross-national survey data set 
countries cannot be said to be randomly sampled, as whether or not a country participates in 
an international survey rather depends on factors such as funding possibilities, research 
interests, etc. In this case, however, there are very few countries that can be said to pertain to 
the Latin American region that are not included in the analysis, and it is difficult to imagine 
how a random sample of countries in the region could possibly be drawn. The assumption of 
randomly sampled Level-2 units is violated, which makes it difficult to generalize beyond 
Latin America. Results are, however, generalizable to the Latin American region. A bigger 
problem that is pointed out by Steenbergen (2011) is that when explanatory variables in MLM 
are shown to have random slopes or intercepts, this may be the result of either (i) that the 
relationship between the underlying latent variable and a covariate varies across countries, or 
(ii) that the measure of the latent variable is not invariant across countries. Problems of 
interpreting such estimates as either (i) or (ii) can be solved if measurement equivalence is 
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 Cited in Strabac (2007, 176). 
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established. Measurement equivalence requires multiple indicators and is thus not always 
possible (Steenbergen 2011). Chapter 3 in the thesis does, however, discuss the measurement 
equivalence of the corruption indicators employed in the analysis. 
Steenbergen (2011) suggest that a fully Bayesian approach can help to solve both of these 
problems (measurement variance and the violated assumption of randomly sampled units). 
Due to my limited familiarity with Bayesian estimation, this approach will not be taken here. I 
will, however, take the limitations into account when interpreting the results.  
2.3 Operationalization of Key Variables 
In the following, I present and discuss the operationalizations of key dependent and 
independent variables. In some cases, I do not report the exact question wordings of each 
variable. Readers are encouraged to review Appendix B for detailed question wordings and 
coding for all variables included in the analyses.  
2.3.1 Dependent variables 
In Chapter 1 it was suggested that the concept of democratic legitimacy is a multifaceted 
concept with, at least, five dimensions, that may be seen as ranging on a continuum from 
specific to diffuse political support. It was also noted that Booth and Seligson (2009) found 
support for an additional dimension when running factor analysis on LAPOP data from 2004, 
namely support for local or municipal government. In order to examine whether the available 
data lends support to the five- or six-dimensional structure of legitimacy suggested by Norris 
(1999) and Booth and Seligson (2009), I ran several factor analyses including indicators that 
are believed to tap into the different dimensions of legitimacy. Indicators were selected on the 
basis of the results and measurements of existing research on public opinion and political 
support. Although only three of the suggested legitimacy dimensions are of interest to the 
thesis, I found it useful to run a factor analysis of the “complete” structure of legitimacy, 
because this will be helpful when choosing how to operationalize the dimensions of interest. 
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Table 4.1  Factor matrix for explanatory analysis with oblique (oblimin) rotation for the pooled sample, n=26137 
Variable Political 
Community 
Regime 
Principles 
Regime 
Performance 
Regime 
Institutions 
Incumbent 
government 
Local 
Government 
Uniqueness 
Approve of people participating in legal 
demonstrations (e5) 
 
-0.1169 
 
 
0.8202 
 
 
-0.0471 
 
 
0.0034 
 
 
-0.0321 
 
 
-0.0019 
 
 
0.3346 
 
 
Approve of people participating in an organization 
or group to try to solve community problems (e8) 
 
0.1232 
 
 
0.8065 
 
 
0.0559 
 
 
-0.0948 
 
 
0.0363 
 
 
-0.0198 
 
 
0.3179 
 
 
Approve of people working for campaigns for a 
political party or a candidate (e11) 
 
0.0529 
 
 
0.7440 
 
 
0.0108 
 
 
0.0915 
 
 
0.0201 
 
 
-0.0351 
 
 
0.4135 
 
 
The courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial (b1)  
 
-0.2397 
 
 
0.0009 
 
 
-0.0946 
 
 
0.8346 
 
 
-0.1817 
 
 
0.0442 
 
 
0.4759 
 
 
 Respect political institutions (b2) 0.3614 
 
-0.0292 
 
0.0320 
 
0.5199 
 
-0.0514 
 
-0.0213 
 
0.5269 
 
Citizens‟ basic rights well protected by the political 
system (b3) 
 
0.0463 
 
 
-0.0663 
 
 
-0.1023 
 
 
0.7099 
 
 
-0.0409 
 
 
0.0033 
 
 
0.4509 
 
 
Feel proud of living under the political system of 
(country) (b4) 
 
0.2503 
 
 
-0.0594 
 
 
-0.1338 
 
 
0.5682 
 
 
0.0468 
 
 
0.0342 
 
 
0.4141 
 
 
One should support the political system of 
(country) (b6) 
 
0.3451 
 
 
-0.0250 
 
 
-0.0149 
 
 
0.5121 
 
 
0.0885 
 
 
0.0632 
 
 
0.4478 
 
 
Trust the justice system (b10a) 
 
-0.0793 
 
-0.0104 
 
-0.0019 
 
0.8545 
 
-0.0387 
 
0.0252 
 
0.3548 
 
Trust the Electoral Tribunal (b11) 
 
0.0409 
 
0.0398 
 
-0.0218 
 
0.6528 
 
0.0890 
 
0.0631 
 
0.4910 
 
Trust the National Congress (b13) 
 
-0.0043 
 
-0.0041 
 
0.0679 
 
0.6396 
 
0.2119 
 
-0.0327 
 
0.4096 
 
Trust the national government  (b14) 
 
0.0800 
 
-0.0095 
 
-0.0017 
 
0.3241 
 
0.5565 
 
0.0088 
 
0.3353 
 
Trust the National Police (b18) 
 
-0.1478 
 
0.0089 
 
0.0176 
 
0.5234 
 
0.1931 
 
-0.1236 
 
0.5467 
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Trust the political parties (21) 
-0.1295 
 
0.0364 
 
0.0576 
 
0.6449 
 
0.1299 
 
-0.0435 
 
0.5152 
 
Trust the President/Prime Minister (b21a) 
 
0.0799 
 
-0.0115 
 
-0.0493 
 
0.1620 
 
0.6531 
 
0.0083 
 
0.3498 
 
Trust the Supreme Court (b31) 
 
-0.0581 
 
0.0611 
 
0.0686 
 
0.6930 
 
0.1742 
 
-0.0076 
 
0.4041 
 
Trust the local/ municipal government (b32)  
 
0.1006 
 
0.0652 
 
0.1607 
 
0.3130 
 
0.0839 
 
-0.6062 
 
0.3559 
 
Proud of being (nationality)  (b43) 
 
0.7667 
 
0.0573 
 
0.1025 
 
-0.1531 
 
0.0568 
 
-0.1221 
 
0.4480 
 
Democracy may have problems, but it is better than 
any other form of government (ing4) 
 
0.1929 
 
 
0.3916 
 
 
-0.2219 
 
 
0.0312 
 
 
-0.0503 
 
 
0.1053 
 
 
0.7096 
 
 
How would you describe the country‟s economic 
situation? (soct1) 
0.3172 
 
-0.0427 
 
0.6885 
 
-0.0331 
 
-0.0463 
 
0.1198 
 
0.4400 
 
Country‟s economic situation better than, the same 
as, or worse than 12 months ago (soct2) 
 
0.2324 
 
 
-0.0477 
 
 
0.6444 
 
 
0.0856 
 
 
-0.1361 
 
 
0.0046 
 
 
0.5488 
 
 
Rate the job of current president (M1) -0.0789 
 
0.0725 
 
0.3004 
 
0.1772 
 
-0.6130 
 
0.0983 
 
0.4022 
 
Performance of members of Parliament/Congress 
(m2) 
-0.0340 
 
0.0777 
 
0.2057 
 
-0.0827 
 
-0.2797 
 
0.2416 
 
0.6206 
 
How democratic is country (pn5) -0.2693 
 
0.0059 
 
0.6197 
 
-0.0784 
 
0.0672 
 
-0.0618 
 
0.4753 
 
Satisfaction with democracy (pn4) -0.1844 
 
0.0767 
 
0.5863 
 
-0.1160 
 
-0.0078 
 
0.0152 
 
0.4890 
 
Quality of services provided by municipality -0.0883 
 
-0.0067 
 
0.1194 
 
0.0843 
 
0.1536 
 
0.9326 
 
0.2033 
 
Current administration fights poverty (n1) -0.0435 
 
0.0227 
 
-0.0023 
 
-0.0271 
 
0.8842 
 
0.0535 
 
0.2936 
 
Current administration promotes democratic (n3) 
principles 
 
0.0322 
 
 
0.0577 
 
 
-0.0074 
 
 
0.0611 
 
 
0.8267 
 
 
0.1014 
 
 
0.2891 
 
 
Current administration combats government 
corruption (n9) 
-0.0429 
 
 
-0.0115 
 
 
0.0638 
 
 
0.0670 
 
 
0.8490 
 
 
0.0821 
 
 
0.3201 
 
 
Eigenvalue 1.089 1.058 1.799 9.286 7.040 1.180  
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It is recommended by Hair et al. (1998, 98) that five or more variables should be included for 
each proposed factor. I included 29 indicators, and 6 factors were proposed when running the 
factor analyses on the pooled sample. Because different indicators had different scales, all 
variables were standardized into having a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1.  
Theory suggests that the different legitimacy dimensions are related to each other, i.e. that 
there are reasons to assume inter-factor correlation. The assumption of inter-factor correlation 
points toward an oblique (oblimin) rotational method (Hair et al. 1998, 110). I ran factor 
analyses making use of both orthogonal and oblique solutions, and a somewhat clearer 
structure emerged when choosing the oblique solution (not shown).The inclusion of a total 29 
variables resulted in a substantial reduction of the dataset, due to that several units had 
missing values on one or more of the indicators included. The results for exploratory 
(principal components) analysis with oblique rotational solution are presented in Table 1. 
Variables with factor loadings above .50, which indicates practical significance (Hair et al. 
1998, 111), have been given dark grey shadings. 
Separate analyses for each country were conducted, and results showed that some patterns 
were more consistent across countries than others. In general, however, analyses lent support 
to the same legitimacy structure as the one presented here. Results are very much similar to 
Booth and Seligson‟s (2009, 271-73) factor analysis of 2004 AB data. In the following, I 
discuss the operationalizations of the dependent variables in relation to the factor analysis 
presented in Table 2.1.  
Measuring Regime Institutions 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the regime institutions dimension of legitimacy relates to the 
functioning of democratic institutions, and citizens support for and trust in these. Of the three 
legitimacy dimensions put under scrutiny in the thesis, this dimension is the most specific 
one. The factor analysis showed that several variables distributed highly significant loadings 
on the regime institutions dimension. In order to capture citizen trust in regime institutions, I 
chose to create an additive index of the indicators asking about citizens‟ trust in (i) the justice 
system, (ii) the Electoral Tribunal, (iii) the National Congress, (iv) the political parties, and 
(v) the Supreme Court. I consider these institutions key institutions of democracy. I did not 
include the indicator which relates to trust in the National Police as it had an extremely high 
number of missing values.  
33 
 
Respondents are asked to assess to which extent they trust the above mentioned institutions on 
a scale from 1 to 7. Variables were recoded into low values indicating low levels of trust, and 
high values indicating high values of trust. The resulting index was transformed into a 0-100 
scale. I will label this dimension “Institutional Trust.” Figure 1 displays each country‟s mean 
values of institutional trust. 
Figure 2.1 Mean Institutional Trust across 23 Latin American countries 
 
Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project, 2010 
Uruguay is the only country where mean institutional trust exceeds 60 on the 100 point scale, 
while Argentina displays the lowest mean institutional trust (below 40). Most countries range 
between 40 and 50, indicating that mean trust in institutions across countries is relatively low 
in the Latin American region. 
Measuring Regime Performance 
The regime performance dimension attempts at capturing citizen support for and evaluations 
of the political regime‟s performance in general. The factor analysis showed that four 
indicators distributed high loadings on this dimension. I chose to measure regime 
performance by summing together two of these variables, namely satisfaction with democracy 
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and evaluation of how democratic the country is.
20
 I will label this dimension satisfaction with 
democracy. In the case of the satisfaction with democracy measure, respondents were asked 
“In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very 
dissatisfied with the way democracy works in [country]?” The second indicator asks how 
democratic respondents believe that their country is. Both variables are ordinal scaled with 4 
response categories, and they were recoded into low values indicating low satisfaction, and 
high values high satisfaction. The resulting measure was transformed into a 0-100 scale. I will 
label this dimension “Satisfaction with Democracy.” Figure 2 displays mean values of support 
for regime performance for all 23 countries. Overall, mean satisfaction with democracy is 
higher than mean institutional trust across countries. Again, Uruguayan citizens exhibit the 
highest mean levels of satisfaction with democracy, while citizens of Guyana exhibit the 
overall lowest mean. 
Figure 2.2  Mean Satisfaction with Democracy across 23 Latin American countries 
 
Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project, 2010. 
In light of the debate concerning the meaning of the well-known satisfaction with democracy 
(SWD) indicator, the measurement validity of regime performance deserves some discussion 
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 Variables pn4, and pn5 in Table 1 and Appendix B. 
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here. Some scholars have treated SWD as a measure of system support (see Anderson and 
Guillory 1997), while others state it is clearly a measure of system performance (Linde and 
Ekman 2003). Others argue it is impossible to arrive at a general conclusion about what we 
are really measuring when we analyze SWD, showing that the measure is a diffuse 
multisource item that in several countries is frequently confounded with system support. 
According to these scholars, this creates limited possibilities for cross-national comparison 
(Canache, Mondak, and Seligson 2001). 
I argue that the SWD indicator is a measure of system performance, not system support. Both 
satisfaction with democracy and evaluation of how democratic the country distributed 
significant loadings on the same dimension as did evaluation of the country‟s current and past 
economic situation, indicators which are conventionally used as measures of evaluations of 
performance (Booth and Seligson 2009, 34). Also, when running factor analyses for separate 
countries, this pattern was found to be more or less clear in all countries. However, in some 
countries the satisfaction with democracy measure was confounded with the item asking 
about respondents‟ belief in democracy as the superior political system. Whether or not this 
item is confounded with support for “democracy,” is discussed when interpreting and 
discussing the results in Chapter 4 and 5.   
Measuring Regime Principles 
The regime principles dimension refers to citizens‟ normative support for democracy, i.e. 
their support for the central principles of democracy. In the operationalization of this 
dimension I follow Booth and Seligson‟s (2009, 33) approach by constructing an additive 
index of three items measuring support for democratic participation rights. Respondents are 
asked to indicate how much they approve, on a scale from 1 (strongly disapprove) to 10 
(strongly approve), of (i) people participating in legal demonstrations, (ii) people participating 
in an organization or group to try to solve community problems, (iii) people working for 
campaigns for a political party or candidate. The index was transformed into a 0-100 scale. 
Figure 3 displays the country means of normative support for democracy. Clearly, support for 
regime principles is very high throughout the region. Again, Uruguay has the highest mean 
value. Bolivia and Honduras are the only two countries with means below 60. 
Figure 2.3  Mean Normative Support for Democracy across 23 Latin American countries 
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Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project, 2010. 
I argue that measuring citizen support for central democratic rights is a highly valid approach 
to the measurement of citizens‟ normative support for democracy. Participation is one of 
democracy‟s most central features (cf. Dahl 1971, 1-2). Citizen adherence to such rights and 
values, and their granting of these rights to people in general, is necessary for the survival of 
democracy. The chosen approach is not, however, in accordance with conventional 
approaches to measuring the normative support for democracy. Support for democracy is 
usually measured by indicators asking respondents about the preference for democracy over 
alternative forms of governance. On the grounds of the results from the factor analysis I argue 
that this measure clearly taps support for democratic principles, and is a superior way of 
measuring this type of abstract, diffuse support than for example relying on the “Churchill 
quote” (variable ing4), which is an example of one of the indicators conventionally to capture 
of support for democracy as a political system (see Rose and Mishler 1996) . When running 
separate factor analyses for individual countries, this item was sometimes confounded with 
the satisfaction with democracy item. I argue, therefore, that when attempting to measure the 
normative support for democracy it is better to rely on support for key principles of 
democracy, than on a single indicator asking about support for “democracy.” Additionally, 
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the regime principles dimension proved to be the most robust of all when running factor 
analyses for each individual country.  
2.3.2 Individual-level predictors 
In this section, I describe the operationalizations of the key independent variables at the 
individual and aggregate level. Again, readers are encouraged to review Appendix B for 
detailed question formulations and coding.  
Corruption experience 
The LAPOP questionnaire contains several items that tap into citizen experience with bribe 
solicitations in dealings with public officials and public services. I will label this type of 
corruption experience with bureaucratic corruption. Respondents are asked if they in the past 
12 months have been solicited a bribe (i) by a police officer; (ii) by a government official; (iii) 
in official dealings with the municipal or local government; (iv) at work; (v) in dealings with 
the courts; (vi) in dealings with public health services; and (vii) in school. All variables are 
dichotomous with yes (=1) and no (=0) as response categories. All respondents are asked 
about having been solicited for a bribe by a police officer or a government official when 
asking for example “Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?”  
Before asking about bribe experience in relation to specific services, LAPOP filters out 
respondents by first assessing whether respondents have been in contact with the specific 
institution of interest.
21
 Respondents that answer positively are asked about their experience 
with bribe solicitation. For example, one question reads “In the last twelve months, did you 
have any official dealings in the municipality/local government? In the last twelve months, to 
process any kind of document like a permit, for example, did you have to pay any money 
beyond that required by law?” 
I choose to include six out of the seven items mentioned above. Work-related bribe 
experience is excluded because I agree with Ruhl (2011, page) that it mixes up the 
public/private distinction central to the chosen corruption definition. I created an index of 
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 A problem encountered here was that Stata automatically coded respondents that had not been in contact with 
the services as missing, lumped together with respondents that did not answer (NA) or did not know (DK). After 
several attempts to solve this “hidden” missing values problem, I saw no other solution than to include all 
respondents (i.e., giving respondents with DK and NA the value 0). I ran analyses with the same index where 
units that had not been in contact with the service of interest, or had missing values, and found no discrepancy 
between the index including missing values and the index excluding missing values.   
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bribe experience, ranging from 0 (no experience/no contact) to 4 (bribe experience in dealings 
with 4 or more services). The index reflects the respondent‟s number of personal experiences 
with bribe solicitation in the year prior to their being surveyed, without differentiating 
between the different domains within which it occurred. The indicator was treated as 
continuous in all three analyses, after having constructed dummy variables to examine the 
difference between groups and differences in model fit. 
Corruption perceptions 
The LAPOP survey includes two items that can be said to tap into citizens‟ perceptions of 
corruption at the bureaucratic and political level. The first measure taps into perceptions of the 
frequency of corruption among public officials in general. Respondents are asked “Taking 
into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials 
is very common, common, uncommon, or very uncommon.” The variable was recoded into 
0=very uncommon/uncommon, 1=common and 2=very common. From the recoded variable I 
constructed three dummy variables. In the analysis the dummy variables identify individuals 
that perceive corruption among public officials to be common (labeled public officials are 
somewhat corrupt), and individuals that perceive corruption among public officials to be very 
common (labeled public officials are very corrupt).  
Because the variable asks about perceptions of corruption among public officials without 
defining societal domains or referring to any specific acts that may be defined as corrupt, it is 
difficult to assess the validity of this measure. It could be that because the question is asked 
straight after asking about experience with bureaucratic corruption, respondents may have 
bribe paying and taking in mind when assessing the extent to which they perceive public 
officials to be corrupt. This is far from conclusive, however, due to the vague wording of the 
question; we cannot know what respondents associate with the word “corruption” and if they 
associate a “public official” with a low-level or high-level official. Regardless, I label the 
variable perception of bureaucratic corruption as this facilitates comparison with the other 
perception measure employed in the analyses. 
The second item included taps into individuals‟ perceptions of the extent to which the current 
administration combats government corruption. Respondents are asked to give an assessment 
of to which extent they believe “the current administration combats government corruption” 
on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a lot). The variable was recoded into 0(a lot) and 6(not at 
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all). The variable is approximately interval scaled and is included as continuous in the 
analyses. Again, there is a problem of whether individuals associate “corruption” with 
different types of acts, and whether or not these associations correspond to the chosen 
corruption definition. It is highly plausible that the respondents‟ perception of the extent to 
which the current administration combats government corruption is greatly influenced by 
individual political affiliation and satisfaction with the incumbent government. I will label 
this variable perception of political corruption because it clearly taps into perceptions of the 
existence of corruption at the political level (or, more precisely, the presence or absence of 
efforts at combating government corruption).   
Corruption permissiveness 
I control for citizen tolerance of corruption, corruption permissiveness, measured by an 
indicator that ask respondents about their attitudes toward bribe paying. Respondents are 
asked to answer yes (=1) or no (=0) to the question “Given the way things are, do you think 
paying a bribe is sometimes justified?” The advantage to this measure is that it asks 
specifically about bribes. Without any reference to actors involved, however, it is difficult to 
argue whether or not the item measures justification of either high-level or low-level 
corruption, or both. Taking into account that the question is asked directly after questions 
about experience with bureaucratic corruption where the role of the citizen is the bribe payer, 
I argue it is more likely a measure of the tolerance of low-level corruption, justifying the act 
of a citizen paying a bribe. This is not conclusive, of course, but the question wording 
suggests that the item captures respondents‟ justification of citizens in general (or themselves) 
paying a bribe under certain circumstances which legitimize such conduct. 
Measurement validity of the corruption indicators 
A brief discussion of the measurement validity of the corruption indicators is warranted here. 
Corruption was in Chapter 1 defined as “the improper use of public office in exchange for 
private gain.” Among the indicators of corruption included in the analysis, the corruption 
experience measure is the by far the most valid measure of corruption. Bribery was in Chapter 
1 considered the “essence” of corruption, which is precisely what these indicators attempt to 
measure. There are two advantages to the way corruption experience is measured by LAPOP.  
First, the questions filter out respondents that have not been in contact with the specific 
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services of interest, which reduces the possibility of respondents that have not been in contact 
with specific services still answer positively to the questions about bribe solicitation. aThe 
second advantage to this measure is that it clearly defines the role of the citizen versus the 
role of the public official(s). Because respondents are asked whether they have been solicited 
a bribe by a public official, this suggests that the public officials is the initiator of the corrupt 
transaction (the corrupter), and citizens are “victims” of corruption (the corrupted) (Seligson 
2006, page). There are, of course, certain limitations to this approach as well. It is only 
possible to capture low-level corruption, not high-level corruption. And although the question 
wording clarifies the role of the citizen versus the public officials, we cannot guarantee that 
some of the respondents answered positively to the question(s) were not themselves the 
initiators of the corrupt transaction. 
The validity and cross-cultural comparability of the corruption perceptions measures are, 
however, more difficult to assess. The question wordings are vague in the sense that they do 
not explicitly refer to examples of corrupt acts when asking about corruption. Different 
conceptions of the word “corruption” across countries and individuals may inhibit cross-
national comparison because we are not able to know what respondents associate with the 
“corruption”, both within and across countries. This problem is discussed more in detail in 
Chapter 3, where the correspondence between the various indicators of corruption employed 
in the analysis, are compared across, and within countries. However, it was argued in Chapter 
1 that because Western conceptions of corruption have been the major reference point for 
much Latin American experience, we are probably not way off when assuming that Latin 
American and Caribbean citizens associate corruption with acts such as bribe paying and 
taking, illegal campaign funding, buying and selling of votes, etc.
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Satisfaction with incumbent government 
I include a variable measuring respondents‟ satisfaction with the performance of the 
incumbent government as a proxy for political affiliation. The original thought was to control 
for individual political affiliation, as this has been shown to affect both individual attitudes 
toward democracy and individual perceptions of corruption (Anderson and Tverdova 2003). 
However, due to large numbers of missing values and the questions about either hypothetical 
vote in the next election or previous voting-behavior not having been asked in all countries, it 
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 See Morris (2008). 
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was not possible to control for political affiliation without excluding one or more countries 
from the analysis. Because I prefer to keep the number of countries as high as possible, I 
choose to include an indicator that ask respondents to rate the job of the current 
administration and president/prime minister from very good (=0) to very bad (=6).  
The original argument for including political affiliation was that individuals that are 
supportive of the government may exhibit more positive attitudes toward democracy in 
general, and may also perceive lower levels of bureaucratic and political corruption than do 
opposition partisans. The same argument can be made for the item measuring satisfaction 
with the incumbent government, as it is very probable that satisfied individuals perceive less 
corruption and are more positive toward democracy in general. On the grounds of this, I 
believe including the satisfaction with incumbent government measure serves as a good proxy 
because it will capture some of the same variation that is accounted for by political affiliation 
measures. 
Socio-demographic controls 
I control for sex, age, and education.
23
 Sex is coded 0 for females and 1 for males. Age is kept 
more or less in its original form, ranging from 16 to 97, recoded into ranging from 16 to 90. I 
ran models including age categories, but keeping age continuous resulted in the most 
satisfactory results when considering assumptions of linearity. Education measured as years 
of formal education, ranging from 1 (no formal education or 1 year of primary school) to 18 
(18 or more years of formal education). As was the case for the age variable, analyses 
indicated that keeping the education variable as continuous was the best option compared to 
treating it as categorical or dichotomous. Although the assumptions of linearity are not 
completely satisfied in this case, the regression coefficients give reasonable estimates of the 
relationship between education and democratic legitimacy in all three analyses.  
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 The original thought was to also control for income. However, the variable capturing household income levels 
had a very large number of missing values, which resulted in a substantial reduction of the data set. Income is, 
however, moderately to strongly correlated with a person‟s level of education (.41). Because I assume that 
including education will account for some of the variation in income levels between individuals, in addition to 
the fact that level of income is not among the main explanatory variables of interest to the thesis, I chose to 
exclude this variable.  
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2.3.3 Country-level predictors 
In Chapter 1 it was discussed whether institutional performance could to some extent 
moderate the relationship between corruption and legitimacy in the Latin American region. 
Are individual experiences with, and evaluations of, the political performance (corruption) 
more important for democratic legitimacy in countries where institutional performance is low 
versus in countries where institutional performance is high? The thesis tests three measures of 
institutional performance: two measures of countries‟ level of corruption, and countries level 
of institutional performance. The indicators are highly correlated and tap into the same 
underlying construct; political performance. However, because it was discussed in Chapter 1 
whether a country‟s level of corruption could moderate the individual-level relationship 
between corruption and legitimacy, corruption is singled out and measured in two different 
ways.  
Level of Corruption 
I make use of two measures that capture countries‟ level of corruption. Transparency 
International‟s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), and a country‟s level of bureaucratic 
corruption (percentage of individuals that have experienced corruption the past year). 
Transparency International‟s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) measures elite perceptions of 
bureaucratic and political corruption. The index ranges from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly 
clean). The CPI relies on a variety of sources, and reports high inter-correlation between the 
different independent surveys used in assessing different countries‟ corruption levels. This 
indicator is labeled CPI.   
The second measure captures the frequency of bureaucratic corruption, and is the aggregate of 
the proportion of citizens that have experienced being solicited a bribe the year prior to the 
survey (*100). The indicator is labeled “frequency of bureaucratic corruption” (FBC) in the 
analysis. 
Institutional Performance 
I construct an additive index that I label Institutional Performance on the basis of three 
governance indicators obtained from the World Bank‟s Worldwide Governance Indicators 
database: government effectiveness, voice and accountability, and rule of law. All three 
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indicators are based on the perceptions of individuals and domestic firms (by the use of 
surveys), country analysts at multilateral development agencies, nongovernmental 
organizations, and commercial business information providers (Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi 2010, 5-6). Countries are given scores on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5, where low values 
indicate low values of, for example, government effectiveness, and high values indicate high 
levels of government effectiveness. 
The government effectiveness variable captures perceptions of the quality of public services, 
the civil service, and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of the 
formulation and implementation of policy, and the credibility of the government‟s 
commitment to such policies (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010, 4). Rule of law 
captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society: the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, the courts, and the 
likelihood of crime and violence (ibid.). The voice and accountability indicator measures 
perceptions of the extent to which a country‟s citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010, 4).  
The three indicators tap somewhat distinct dimensions of governance but correlated very 
strongly at the country level (above .70). On the grounds of this I constructed an additive 
index, transformed into a scale ranging 0 (low governance) to 10 (high governance), labeled 
“Institutional Performance.”   
Economic Development 
I control for economic development by including a measure of gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita (converted into purchasing power parity) ($1000) 2008, obtained from the UNDP 
Human Development Index, as a country‟s level of corruption has been found to be strongly 
correlated with a country‟s wealth (Treisman 2007; 2000). This is also a standard measure of 
economic development in comparative political science (Treisman 2000). 
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2.4 General Reliability and Validity of the Study 
LAPOP makes use of stratification and clustering in order to obtain representative samples of 
the population. I assume that samples are representative and data reliable. Because I have 
estimated fixed effects models with GLLAMM where sample weights were incorporated, 
these results are generalizable to the whole Latin American region. There is some uncertainty 
as for the results obtained from cross-level interactions between country-level predictors and 
individual-level predictors. A small number of Level-2 units can make it difficult to achieve 
significant results if the relationship is weak or even moderate. Because of the inability to 
incorporate sample weights in these analyses, results should be interpreted with caution, 
although attempts have been made to test the reliability of the results by excluding countries 
that make the incorporation of sample weights necessary, and run the same model on the 
remaining countries. 
The degree to which we will be able to make valid inferences about corruption and 
democratic legitimacy, however, to a great extent relies on the measurement validity of the 
corruption indicators. This is discussed throughout the thesis. 
2.4.1 A note on causality  
The thesis makes no attempt at establishing the causal direction of the relationship between 
corruption and trust and support for democracy. In the estimated models, corruption 
perceptions are assumed to influence trust and support. However, the opposite is equally 
plausible, and studying the relationship between corruption perceptions and trust and support 
raises questions about endogeneity. The difficulty of establishing this causal direction is 
recognized.  
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3 Perceptions versus Experiences in 
Latin America 2010 
In light of the measurement debate that revolves around the validity and reliability of different 
subjective measures of corruption, this chapter attempts to, by means of bivariate analysis, 
shed some light on the status of corruption in the Latin American and Caribbean region in 
2010. In the following, I look at the level of correspondence between various measures of 
corruption, comparing TI‟s Corruption Perception Index‟ (CPI) estimates of corruption levels 
with individual-level perceptions and experiences. Following this, I look at the gap between 
reported experience with corruption and individual perceptions of it, and discuss the 
measurement validity of corruption perception measures. 
3.1 How Corrupt are the Latin American Countries? 
Claims are many that macro-level corruption indices cannot accurately capture the level of 
corruption in different societies throughout the world. Here, I take Transparency 
International‟s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) as a point of departure for discussing the 
current state of corruption in the Latin American and Caribbean region. Table 3.1 displays the 
Latin American and Caribbean countries‟ scores in the 2010 CPI index.24 According to TI, 
Scores below 5.0 indicate serious problems with corruption, and scores below 3.0 denote 
“rampant” corruption (Ruhl 2011). Among the Latin American countries, Chile, Uruguay, and 
Costa Rica are the only countries with scores above 5.0. Thus, according to country experts 
and political and business elites, most Latin American countries suffer from high levels of 
corruption. 
At the same time, the 95 % confidence intervals are for some countries very wide. Consider 
Brazil, a country that has overlapping confidence intervals with both Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua, two countries considered as two of the least and most corrupt in the region, 
respectively. The wide confidence intervals indicate that the CPI scores should be interpreted 
with caution, especially when comparing one country to another based on their country score 
one particular year. Nevertheless, Chile and Uruguay stand out as the countries perceived to 
be much less corrupt than the majority of the Latin American countries. At the other end   
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 Recall that the index ranges from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean). 
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of the scale, we find Paraguay and Venezuela.  
The surveys employed by TI include questions 
about the perceived extent of bribery by 
public officials, kickbacks in public 
procurement, embezzlement of public funds, 
and “questions that probe the strength and 
effectiveness of public sector anti-corruption 
efforts” (TransparencyInternational 2010, 4). 
The sources used by the CPI aim at measuring 
the same phenomenon (corruption), and do 
not distinguish between bureaucratic and 
political corruption.  Although some scholars 
argue that the CPI to a greater extent captures 
high-level corruption, and not so much low-
level corruption (Ruhl 2011, 39), Lambsdorff  (2006, 85) asserts that both dimensions of 
corruption are equally addressed by the surveys. If Lambsdorff (2006) is correct and the CPI 
does capture both high-level and low-level corruption, we should expect that the countries‟ 
CPI scores correspond to citizens‟ perceptions and mass experiences. If elite and mass 
perceptions are congruent, the reliability of the corruption perception measures increases 
(Tverdova 2011). If the CPI also corresponds to citizen reported experience with corruption, 
this increases the validity of the CPI index (Adcock and Collier 2001, 540).  
3.1.1 Do Elite Perceptions and Mass Perceptions and Experiences 
Correspond? 
In the following, I present three graphs that illustrate the bivariate correlations between CPI 
scores and citizen corruption perceptions and experiences. Figure 3.1 presents a scatter plot of 
CPI scores against mass perceptions of political corruption (country mean) with a quadratic 
fitted prediction line, and a 95 % confidence interval. 
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 The minimum number of sources required for a country to be included in the index is three (Transparency 
International 2010, 4). As data was not available for Suriname in the 2010 index, Suriname‟s score was obtained 
from the 2009 CPI index. 
Table 3.1    Country CPI scores, N=23 
Country Score Surveys 95 % CI 
Chile  7.2 7 6.8 - 7.7 
Uruguay 6.9 5 6.2 - 7.4 
Costa Rica 5.3 5 4.7 - 6.8 
Brazil 3.7 7 2.7 - 5.6 
Suriname 3.7 3 3.0 – 4.7 
El Salvador 3.6 5 3.3 - 3.9 
Panama 3.6 5 3.1 - 4.7 
T&T 3.6 4 2.8 – 4.7 
Colombia 3.5 7 3.1 – 5.2 
Perú 3.5 7 3.3 – 3.7 
Jamaica 3.3 5 2.7 – 3.5 
Guatemala 3.2 5 2.6 – 3.5 
Mexico 3.1 7 2.7 – 3.6 
Dom.Rep. 3.0 5 2.5 – 3.4 
Argentina 2.9 7 2.4 – 3.6 
Bolivia 2.8 6 2.1 – 3.3 
Guyana 2.7 4 2.6 – 2.9 
Nicaragua 2.5 6 1.9 – 2.8 
Ecuador 2.5 5 1.9 – 2.8 
Honduras 2.4 6 1.9 – 3.0 
Paraguay 2.2 5 1.7 – 2.7 
Venezuela 2.0 7 1.5 – 2.3 
Source: Transparency International 2010, 2009
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Figure 3.1 CPI scores versus mean mass perceptions of political corruption in 23 Latin American 
countries 2010 
 
Source: LAPOP 2010; Transparency International 2010, 2009. 
The correspondence between elite and citizen perceptions of corruption is greater in countries 
that the elites perceive to be fairly clean. Mass perceptions of political corruption are far less 
pronounced in Chile and Uruguay than in the rest of the countries in the region. This 
particular finding corroborates Tverdova‟s (2011, 7) finding that, when studying elite and 
mass perceptions of corruption in 30 countries world-wide, the correlation was greater in 
countries with CPI scores above 6.0. The relationship becomes less clear when we examine 
the countries where the elites perceive corruption to be serious or rampant. Mass perceptions 
of political corruption are, for instance, lower in Honduras than in Costa Rica. 
Figure 3.1 presents a scatter plot of CPI scores against mass the percentage of citizens that 
perceive corruption among public officials to be very common. Again, mass perceptions of 
the prevalence of corruption among public officials are lower in Uruguay and Chile compared 
to the rest of the countries. More or less the same picture emerges in Figure 3.2 as in Figure 
3.1, although the correspondence between CPI and perceptions of political corruption seem 
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Figure 3.2.  CPI versus percentage of population perceiving corruption among public officials to be very 
common, 23 Latin American countries 2010 
 
Source: LAPOP 2010, Transparency International 2010, 2009 
higher than the correspondence between CPI and perceptions of corruption among public 
officials. 
Lack of congruence between the different perception measures can be the result of a variety of 
factors. Clearly, citizens of Uruguay and Chile on a general level perceive lower levels of 
corruption.  Tverdova (2011, 8) suggests that increases in corruption become less noticeable 
to the public once political malfeasance achieves a certain level. It could be that country 
experts are able to give more critical and accurate assessments of a country‟s level of 
corruption than are average citizens. As argued by Ruhl (2011, 40), ordinary citizens tend to 
have broader conceptions of corruption, which may contribute to the lack of congruence 
between the measures. Citizen perceptions of corruption are most probably the result of a 
variety of factors – they can be based on own experience, what have happened to have heard, 
their attitudes toward the system, anti-corruption campaigns, and the like (Morris 2008). 
Additionally, we are comparing the countries‟ CPI score (based on a variety of sources) to 
49 
 
two single indicators that capture citizen perceptions of “corruption,” questions that in the 
LAPOP survey give no examples of what “corruption” refers to.  
What about reported experience with low-level corruption? Is bureaucratic corruption more 
frequent in countries perceived to suffer from high levels of corruption? Figure 3.3 displays a 
scatterplot of the relationship between country CPI scores and the percentage of citizens that 
reported having experienced corruption the year prior to the survey. 
Figure 3.3  CPI versus reported corruption experience, N=23 
 
Source: LAPOP (http://www.lapopsurveys.org); Transparency International 2010, 2009 
Again, Chile and Uruguay seem to be the least corrupt in the region, but the frequency of 
bureaucratic corruption in these countries does not seem to be very different from the 
situation in Jamaica, Panama, Trinidad & Tobago. It could be that the CPI index to a larger 
extent reflects political corruption (Morris 2008; Ruhl 2011), which would indicate that 
bureaucratic corruption is somewhat independent from levels of political corruption (at least 
in countries that are perceived to suffer from rampant corruption).  
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3.1.2 Do behavior and perception correspond at the individual level? 
As pointed out by Morris (2008), experiences (participation) and perceptions are conceptually 
distinct; experience relates to individual behavior, while perceptions focus on beliefs. In 
discussing the possible relationship between beliefs about corruption and participation in it, 
Morris (2008, 391) contends that it is theoretically possible to identify three non-mutually 
exclusive relationships between perceptions of corruption and experiences with corruption. A 
first possibility is that experience with paying bribes may influence individuals‟ perceptions 
about how widespread corruption is in the broader political system. A second possibility is 
that perceptions about the political system (including how widespread corruption is) influence 
individual behavior, where individuals who perceive corruption to be widespread are more 
inclined to engage in corrupt behavior. Third, the possibility exists that experience with 
corruption and perceptions of it are largely unrelated to one another (Morris 2008, 391-92). 
Figure 3.4 displays the difference between individual reported experience with corruption, 
and their perceptions of corruption among public officials. The grey bars represent the  
Figure 3.4  Reported corruption experience versus individual perceptions of corruption among public 
officials in 23 Latin American countries 2010. 
 
Source: LAPOP 2010 (http://www.lapopsurveys.org) 
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the percentage of individuals perceiving corruption among public officials to be very 
common, and navy bars represent the percentage of individuals perceiving corruption among 
public officials to be common. Green bars represent the percentage of respondents that 
reported having been solicited a bribe the last 12 months. 
Because the indicator that captures perceptions of corruption among public officials is asked 
almost directly after asking about citizen corruption experience, as well as it is somewhat 
leading when asking “taking into account your own experience…,” one might expect that 
citizen perceptions to a certain extent corresponded to reported experience. The figure 
illustrates that this is clearly not the case. Perceptions of corruption among public officials are 
highly salient throughout the region, and seem to be independent of reported experience. 
That individual perceptions of corruption are far more salient than reported corruption 
experience is not a surprise, and not atypical of the Latin American region (see Rose and 
Mishler 2010). Bivariate correlations in separate countries showed that experience and 
perceptions correlates positively and significantly (but weakly, around .15) in 10 of the 
countries, whereas in the remaining 13 the correlation was not significant. This it could point 
to that we are measuring different phenomena, which again may lead to corruption experience 
and corruption perceptions having somewhat different consequences for democratic 
legitimacy. Consider, for example, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago, where reported 
corruption experience is among the lowest in the region – but above 90 % of the population 
perceive corruption among public officials to be common or very common. When comparing 
the effect of corruption perceptions on legitimacy – what are we really measuring? If above 
80 and 90 percent of the population perceive corruption to be common or very common – 
who are we comparing these individuals to when analyzing the effects corruption perceptions 
have on legitimacy? 
Data from the Corruptometro Surveys undertaken in Mexico showed that the majority of 
citizens associate bribes, dishonesty, and delinquency with the word corruption (Bailey and 
Paras 2006, 64). Mexico need not be very different from the rest of the Latin American 
countries (Morris and Klesner 2010). However, about 13-15 percent of Mexicans answering 
the question “in a few words, what does corruption mean to you?” in 2001 and 2002 did not 
know what corruption meant. In the LAPOP survey, no such question is asked and it is 
therefore difficult to establish what corruption means to average citizens in different countries 
the region.  Attempts at validating the indicator by examining the correlation between 
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perceptions of corruption and other evaluations of political performance, did not result in 
correlations greater than around .2, and it seems as though the corruption perceptions 
indicator captures a range of factors that are difficult to grasp. However, although citizens‟ 
perceptions of corruption as they know it might reflect a whole range of factors more or less 
independent of actual corruption, is corruption, as citizens of Latin America know it, is 
corruption a threat to democracy?  
When asked whether a military coup would be justified when there was high levels of 
corruption, a relatively large percentage of respondents in each country answered positively, 
from 57 % and 55 % in Mexico and Perú, to around 20 and 25 % in Argentina and Suriname. 
The percentage of respondents that answered positively to the question in most countries 
ranged between 30 and 40 %. Although the question is difficult to interpret because it is 
difficult to discern what individuals consider to be “a lot” of corruption, this indicates that a 
relatively large percentage of individuals in the Latin American region would give up 
democratic rights and freedoms if the country was pervaded by corruption. This does not 
necessarily reflect undemocratic attitudes, but it may point to that corruption is not viewed as 
benign to democracy. Perceptions of corruption are seemingly important for individual 
attitudes toward the regime. The next chapter looks into the effects of corruption experiences 
and perceptions on democratic legitimacy.  
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4 The Effects of Corruption on 
Democratic Legitimacy 
In this chapter, I present the multilevel regression analyses of the effects of corruption on the 
three dimensions of democratic legitimacy. At this point, it can be useful to recall the thesis‟ 
general research questions. The first question concerned whether corruption experiences and 
corruption perceptions have different effects on various dimensions of legitimacy, which in 
the analyses implies considering whether (i) corruption perceptions and experiences have 
similar effects on the same legitimacy dimension, and (ii) is the corruption indicators more 
strongly influence some legitimacy dimensions than others. The second general research 
question concerns the contextual effects of countries‟ institutional quality and level of 
corruption on the relationship between corruption and legitimacy: (i) do the effects of 
corruption perceptions and experiences on legitimacy vary across countries, and (ii) is some 
of this variation explained by institutional quality and level of corruption? 
The chapter is structured as follows. Two sections formulate and discuss some general 
hypotheses concerning the individual-level relationships between corruption and democratic 
legitimacy (section 4.1) and the contextual effects of institutional quality and corruption 
(section 4.2). The following section presents the results and interpretation and discussion of 
the results. In a final section I briefly sum up key findings before entering in a more detailed 
discussion about the support for hypotheses, theoretical implications, and implications for 
democracy in Latin America in Chapter 5.    
4.1 Individual-level hypotheses 
Existing research on the individual-level effects of corruption on democratic legitimacy has 
shown that both corruption experience and corruption perceptions decrease legitimacy 
(Seligson 2002, 2006; Morris 2008; Morris and Klesner 2010). On the grounds of this, I 
formulate two general hypotheses concerning the relationship between corruption and the 
three legitimacy dimensions: 
H1 Individual corruption experience is negatively related to individual trust in 
institutions, satisfaction with democracy, and normative support for democracy 
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H2 Individual perceptions of corruption is negatively related to individual trust in 
institutions, satisfaction with democracy, and normative support for democracy 
I assume that there will be a negative relationship between individuals‟ experience with and 
perceptions of corruption, and individual trust in political institutions, satisfaction with 
democracy, and normative support for democracy. Assuming that the relationship between 
corruption and democratic legitimacy is the same on all three dimensions is, however, not 
necessarily a reasonable assumption. It is not, at the outset, obvious to what extent individuals 
who experience corruption will generalize such experiences into beliefs about and attitudes 
toward the broader political system. Research has shown that individuals to a greater degree 
generalize experiences with corruption and perceptions of it to more specific dimensions of 
legitimacy than abstract dimensions (see Morris 2008). I argue that it is reasonable to expect 
that proximate experiences and evaluations of the political performance of the regime in terms 
of curbing corruption will have stronger direct effects on more specific legitimacy 
dimensions, and thus weaker effects on more diffuse dimensions. Therefore, adding to H1 and 
H2: 
H1A The effects of corruption experience will be weaker the more diffuse the legitimacy 
dimension 
H2A The effects of corruption perceptions will be weaker the more diffuse the legitimacy 
dimension 
I expect the effects of corruption to be strongest on the institutional trust dimension, weaker 
on the satisfaction with democracy dimension, and even weaker on the normative support for 
democracy dimension. 
In Chapter 3, however, it was shown that individual perceptions of corruption are a lot more 
salient than reported experience. It was also discussed whether individual perceptions of 
corruption might have different consequences for legitimacy compared to experience. After 
all, corruption experience denotes behavior, while perceptions focus on beliefs. As noted in 
Chapter 1, there are some mixed results as regards for the effects of corruption perceptions on 
support for democracy. Individuals who perceive high levels of corruption are sometimes 
found to be more supportive of democracy as a form of government (Rose, Shin, and Munro 
1999), other times perceptions of corruption and support for diffuse dimensions fail to achieve 
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statistical significance. In other words, the relationship between perceptions of corruption and 
democratic legitimacy may be less straightforward than what is the case for experiences with 
corruption. Because the effect of corruption perceptions is less obvious on more diffuse 
dimensions, I formulate an alternative hypothesis to H2 
H2alt Individuals perceiving high levels of corruption will exhibit higher levels of normative 
support for democracy 
If they do, this can be interpreted as citizens being dissatisfied democrats. That is, they 
recognize that corruption is prevalent (or, this is what they perceive), but distinguish the 
perceived political performance of the regime from the principles upon which it rests.  
I argued in Chapter 2 for the inclusion of individual corruption permissiveness and 
satisfaction with incumbent government as control variables. Corruption permissiveness 
captures citizens‟ justification of paying bribes. Citizens may have various reasons for 
justifying such acts; they may view bribe paying as totally legitimate, or they may feel that it 
is necessary to pay a bribe in order to receive fair and correct treatment in encounters with the 
regime‟s institutions, i.e., that the system makes them do it. Recalling that Tavits (2005) 
found that individuals who did not define corruption as morally wrong were more inclined to 
engage in corrupt behavior, controlling for corruption permissiveness is important because the 
degree to which individuals generalize their experience with corruption into negative attitudes 
toward the system will most likely depend on whether they view such acts as legitimate or 
not. 
H3 Corruption permissiveness will moderate the effects of corruption experience on 
legitimacy 
Whether or not individuals are satisfied with the president and incumbent government will 
also most likely affect the effects of corruption perceptions and experiences on democratic 
legitimacy. Citizens that voted for or are satisfied with the performance of the incumbent 
government, will, probably, to a less 
H4 Satisfaction with the incumbent government will moderate the effects of corruption 
experience and perceptions on legitimacy 
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Finally, existing research has found that socio-demographic background variables not only 
affect individual attitudes toward democracy (Booth and Seligson 2009), but also the degree 
to which they perceive corruption and participate in corruption (Gatti 2003). In order to make 
sure that the relationship between corruption and legitimacy is not spurios, I control for age, 
sex, and education. I expect that socio-demographic background variables influence 
individual behavior, perceptions, and attitudes: 
H5 Socio-demographic background variables will mediate the effects of corruption on 
legitimacy 
It should be noted that it is not in the thesis‟ main interest to focus in particular on the effects 
of sex, age, and education. However, based on previous research we may expect that higher 
educated individuals, for examples, are more critical toward institutions, while more 
supportive of democracy as a political system (Booth and Seligson 2009). 
4.2 Contextual effects of country-level predictors 
In Chapter 1, it was discussed whether differential effects of corruption on legitimacy could 
be explained by institutional performance and level of corruption.  Whether or not 
institutional effectiveness and level of corruption will weaken or strengthen the effects of 
corruption may depend on the diffuseness of the legitimacy dimension, and on the corruption 
measure. For instance, in countries where institutions are generally performing poorly, 
proximate evaluations and experiences may be stronger predictors of diffuse support than in 
countries where institutions are relatively well-functioning. In contrast, citizen expectations 
toward institutions might be different in countries with poor versus good institutional 
performance, as discussed in Chapter 1. Because several possibilities and explanations exist 
for the cross-level interactions between macro-level performance and corruption perceptions 
and experiences, I formulate very general hypotheses concerning the cross-level interactions 
between corruption perceptions and experiences, and institutional effectiveness and level of 
corruption: 
H6 A country’s level of political corruption will strongly determine how individual 
corruption perceptions and experiences relate to democratic legitimacy 
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H7 A country’s level of bureaucratic corruption will strongly determine how individual 
corruption perceptions and experiences relate to democratic legitimacy 
H8 A country’s overall institutional performance will strongly determine how individual 
corruption perceptions and experiences relate to democratic legitimacy 
4.3 Results 
In this section I present the results for the three separate analyses for the relationship between 
corruption and democratic legitimacy. The section is structured as follows: I discuss first on 
which basis I estimate the multilevel models (MLM), considering whether MLM is 
appropriate for examining variation across countries in institutional trust (Analysis I), 
satisfaction with performance (Analysis II), and the normative support for democracy 
(Analysis III). After establishing this, I account for the analytical strategy pursued in each 
analysis. Results are presented and discussed in three subsections. A final section sums up the 
key findings before entering in a discussion of hypotheses, theoretical implications, and 
implications for democracy in Latin America 2010. Results are presented and interpreted in 
three subsections.  
4.3.1 Is multilevel analysis appropriate? 
Table 4.1 displays the individual-level and country-level variance in the empty model 
(without covariates) along with the intra-class correlation (ICC)
 26
 values, and the -2 log 
likelihood values for all dependent variables. The ICC shows that between-country variation 
accounts for approximately 9 % and 8 % of the variance in all three dependent variables,  
Table 4.1  Estimated empty models for all three analyses 
 Institutional Trust Satisfaction with 
Democracy 
Normative Support for 
Democracy 
Estimation method xtmixed GLLAMM xtmixed GLLAMM xtmixed GLLAMM 
Individual-level  (σ00) 476.378 490.075 439.447 438.091 507.906 507.070 
Country-level (τ00) 45.873 54.361 45.814 46.156 46.861 43.577 
ICC ≈ 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.08 
-2 log likelihood -145536.57 -125875.04 -144228.23 -128942.74 -152100.38 -133892.64 
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which is substantial considering that MLM is recommended when the ICC value exceeds 0.05 
(Bickel 2007). 
Explanation of Estimated Models in the Analyses 
In each separate analysis I estimate a total of 5 models. Model 1 estimates the main fixed 
effects of corruption experience, perceptions of corruption among public officials, and 
perception of political corruption. Model 2 adds the individual-level predictors corruption 
permissiveness and satisfaction with incumbent government. Model 3 adds socio-
demographic background variables sex, age, and education. In Model 4, the differential 
effects of the corruption indicators on legitimacy are examined, and presented if found to 
contribute significantly to the model fit.
27
 Differential effects of the remaining individual-
level predictors are not examined as this is not of interest to the thesis. Model 5 presents 
cross-level interactions between country-level predictors and individual-level predictors when 
found to be significant.  
4.3.2 Analysis I – Institutional Trust  
Table 4.2 presents the results for the analysis of the effects of corruption experiences and 
perceptions on institutional trust. The intercept is in Models 1-3 the average mean institutional 
trust across countries, around 46.4 on the 100 point scale.
28
 Regression coefficients indicate 
the average change in institutional trust that is associated with a one-unit increase in the 
predictor variable. Variance components give the individual-level residual variance, and the 
unconditional country-level variance around the average mean institutional trust. On average, 
mean institutional trust varies (roughly) between 32.1 and 61.8 in 95 % of the countries. 
Results from Model 1 support the expectations of a negative effect of corruption experiences 
on institutional legitimacy. As the number of personal experiences with corruption increases, 
institutional trust decreases with around 1.4 points, on average. The results lend further 
support to the notion that “actual” corruption decreases institutional legitimacy, and indicates 
that citizens of Latin American and Caribbean countries do not accept corrupt practices in the 
bureaucracy and among police officers and government officials. This has previously been 
                                                 
27
 The degree to which the effects of an individual-level predictor varies across countries is assessed by 
comparing the difference in deviance from one model to another (Strabac 2007). 
28
 See Myers, Brinck, and Beauchamp (2010) and Enders and Tofighi (2007) for interpretation of CWC centered 
estimates. 
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Table 4.2 Un-weighted parameter estimates for multilevel models on Institutional Trust (n=31582); standard errors in parenthesis  
Predictor Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5a Model 5b 
Intercept 46.390***  (1.532) 46.437*** (1.530) 46.437*** (1.530) 46.469*** (1.532) 46.260*** (1.437) 46.293***  (1.207) 
Corruption experience  -1.425***   (.167) -1.281***  (.166) -1.281***  (.166) -1.740***  (.317) -1.834***  (.256) -1.719***   (.319) 
Corruption common  -1.018***   (.312) -1.035***  (.307) -1.035***  (.307) -1.019**    (.307)  -1.001**    (.307) -1.017**     (.307) 
Corruption very common  -5.442***   (.308) -5.030***  (.304) -5.030***  (.304) -4.969***  (.304) -4.967***  (.304) -4.969***   (.304) 
Political corruption  -5.689***   (.063) -4.837***  (.068) -4.837***  (.068) -4.873***  (.210) -4.874***  (.210) -4.892***   (.199) 
Corruption permissiveness   -.956**      (.302) -.956**      (.302) -.807**      (.302) -.784**      (.210) -.808**       (.302) 
Incumbent government   -4.053***  (.127) -4.053***  (.127) -3.895***  (.129) -3.893**    (.128) -3.889***   (.129) 
Male    .033          (.215)  .045          (.214)  -.047         (.214)  -.046          (.214) 
Age    .028***    (.007)  .029***    (.007)  .029***    (.007)  .029***     (.007) 
Education   -.011          (.028) -.010          (.028) -.010          (.028) -.009           (.028) 
       
Freq. Bur. Corruption (FBC)     -.364*        (.029)  - 
Institutional performance     - 2.321*         (.590) 
GDP per capita     -.127          (.287) -.675*          (.274) 
FBC*Experience     .111***      (.029) - 
Governance*Political corruption     - .157†           (.081)  
Variance components       
Individual-level (σ2) 369.500   (2.942) 357.895  (2.849) 357.728  (2.848) 354.561 (2.825) 354.573 (2.825) 354.560  (2.825) 
Country-level (τ00) 53.734    (16.297) 53.587    (16.25) 53.618    (16.269) 53.713   (16.290) 46.919  (14.972) 33.161    (10.543) 
Corruption experience     1.418     (.682) .578       (.473) 1.433      (1.009) 
Political corruption     .903       (.230) .905       (.300) .795        (.272) 
Cov (experience_perception)    .110       (.338) .261       (.279) .191        (.309) 
Cov (exp_intercept)    -3.033    (2.570) -.341      (1.851) -2.124     (1.957) 
Cov (perc_intercept)    2.170      (1.649) 1.296     (1.593) -.653       (1.354) 
       
-2LL -138232.03 -137728.93 -137727.4 -137623.02 -137620.47 -137617.98 
† p <.10; *p <.05; **p <.01; *** p <.001; * not significant when sample weights were incorporated (GLLAMM)  
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found to be the case in 4, 6, and 8 Latin American countries (Booth and Seligson 2009; 
Seligson 2002, 2006). Extending the analysis to 23 countries in the region lends further 
support to the notion that corruption has negative consequences for citizen trust in institutions 
in the Latin American region. Because citizen experience with corruption is the indicator that 
most directly captures the “fact” of corruption, as compared to mere perceptions of it, this is 
an important finding.  
Largely the same holds true for individual perceptions of corruption. Perceptions of 
corruption among public officials, and perceptions of political corruption, have negative 
effects on institutional trust. Although the strengths of the effects are not totally comparable 
due to indicators having different scales, it is fair to say that perception of political corruption 
seems to be the strongest predictor of institutional trust among the corruption indicators 
included in the analysis. Thus, proximate experience with corruption in encounters with 
public officials and institutions, perceptions of the general „corruptness‟ of public officials, 
and perceptions of the successfulness of the current administration in combating corruption, 
all negatively and significantly affect individuals‟ trust in political institutions. The question 
is whether these relationships are actually a result of other factors, i.e., tolerance of 
corruption, satisfaction with the incumbent government, and socio-demographic background 
variables. 
When controlling for corruption permissiveness and satisfaction with incumbent government 
in Model 2, the effects of corruption experience and perceptions were somewhat weakened. 
The two indicators were included in the model separately in order to be able to examine the 
differential influence of individual corruption permissiveness versus satisfaction with 
incumbent government.
29
 When corruption permissiveness was included, the effect of 
corruption experience was somewhat attenuated, which indicates that individual justification 
and tolerance of bribe paying affects the degree to which experience with corruption is 
generalized into negative feelings toward the broader political system. The main effect of 
corruption experience is, however, still negative and highly significant. The effect is very 
weak, but indicates that citizens who justify paying a bribe not necessarily do this on the basis 
of viewing bribe paying as legitimate. I argue that a reasonable interpretation of the estimate 
is that a majority of individuals who justify paying a bribe do this on the grounds of feeling 
that bribe paying is necessary in order to achieve fair treatment, thus the negative coefficient 
                                                 
29
 This is not shown here as it would lead to a very inefficient presentation of results.  
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indicates that individuals who justify corruption perceive or experience the system as unfair 
and undeserving of trust. 
Satisfaction with incumbent government, in addition to attenuate the effects of corruption 
experience a little, strongly moderated the effects of perceptions of political corruption on 
institutional trust. Comparing the parameter estimates of Model 1 to those of Model 2, it is 
clear that individual perception of political corruption is related to their satisfaction with the 
incumbent government and president. It does also, to some extent, affect perceptions of 
corruption among public officials, but not very strongly. However, the fact that individual 
satisfaction with the current government weaken the effects of corruption experience and 
perceptions of political corruption on institutional trust, give further support to the notion that 
individuals who are affiliated or satisfied with the incumbent government, are less likely to 
generalize perceptions of corruption in government and experience with low-level corruption 
into negative attitudes toward key democratic institutions, corroborating findings of Anderson 
and Tverdova (2003) and Canache and Allison (2005).  
Neither of the socio-demographic background variables included in Model 3 significantly 
affected either of the indicators already included in the analysis. Contrary to expectations, sex, 
age, and education did not moderate the relationship between corruption and institutional 
trust, nor do they themselves exert any significant influence on individual trust in political 
institutions. This finding stands somewhat in contrast to previous findings of the sources of 
institutional legitimacy, where it has been found that higher educated people, for example, are 
less trusting in institutions (Booth and Seligson 2009).  
Thus, so far, the results from Analysis I support the majority of the hypotheses regarding the 
individual-level relationships between corruption and institutional trust. Both corruption 
experience and perceptions decrease levels of institutional trust (H1 and H2). Individual 
corruption permissiveness to a certain extent weakens the effects of corruption experience on 
institutional trust (H3), while individual satisfaction with incumbent government weakens the 
effects of both corruption experience and perceptions of political corruption (H4). No support, 
however, is given to H5, which expected that the above mentioned relationships were 
moderated by sex, age, and education levels of the individuals. On average, the main effects 
of corruption experiences and perceptions on institutional trust remain negative and highly 
significant when controlling for relevant variables. But is it reasonable to assume that the 
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effects of corruption on institutional trust are the same across all Latin American and 
Caribbean countries? 
Did the effects of corruption on institutional trust vary across countries? 
When specifying the random coefficient model (Model 4), all corruption predictors were 
found to have random slopes that varied significantly across countries.
 30
  This means that the 
effects of corruption on institutional trust are not the same in all Latin American and 
Caribbean countries, as they were assumed to be in Models 1-3. Especially interesting is the 
fact that the effects of experiencing low-level corruption were found to vary across countries, 
as it is possible to argue that corruption experience taps into largely the same underlying 
construct (bribe paying) in all countries. Interpreting the variance components of the 
individual-level coefficients is easier if we calculate the standard deviations of the variance 
components, and construct confidence intervals within which the regression slopes for are 
assumed to vary for 95 % of the countries (Bickel 2007). 
The corruption experience regression slope is thus in 95 % of the countries expected to vary 
between .59 and -4.07,
31
 indicating that the effects of experiencing corruption on individual 
trust in political institutions may actually be positive in some countries. The variance 
component for perceptions of political corruption tells us that in 95 % of the countries the 
average effect will vary between -2.031 and -5.755. Thus, the effect of perceptions of political 
corruption on institutional trust is negative in all countries, but weaker in some countries than 
in other. What explains these differences? 
Explaining variations in the effects of corruption on institutional trust 
Controlling for GDP per capita, I ran several models testing whether institutional performance 
or any of the two macro-level corruption indicators (CPI and frequency of bureaucratic 
corruption (FBC)) significantly explained cross-cultural variations in the effects of corruption 
on institutional trust. Between-country variation in level of corruption as measured by the CPI 
                                                 
30
 Several random effects lead to a very high number of parameters that are estimated simultaneously in one 
model. Because the research question concerns whether institutional effectiveness and level of corruption can 
explain between-country variation in the effects of corruption on institutional trust, I did not see it as necessary 
to further complicate the model with an additional random effect (corruption very common) when no significant 
cross-level interactions were found. 
31
 √            Confidence interval: -1.740±1.96*1.19. 
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index did not significantly account for varying effects of corruption on legitimacy. Thus, no 
support is given to H6 in this analysis.  
Frequency of bureaucratic corruption (FBC) did, however, explain variations in the effects of 
corruption experience (Model 5a), and institutional performance explained some of the 
variation in the effects of perceptions of political corruption (Model 5b). The Level-2 slope 
variance of corruption experience decreases by 60 %
32
 when the cross-level interaction 
between FBC and corruption experience is included in the model. In comparison to this, the 
Level-2 slope variance of perceptions of political corruption is reduced by 12 %.
33
 In the 
following, I comment on the results from Model 5a and Model 5b, respectively.   
The cross-level interaction between country-level FBC and individual corruption experience 
in Model 5a is illustrated in Figure 4.1. The figure displays the predicted regression slopes for 
countries 
Figure 4.1 Institutional trust as a function of experienced corruption and frequency of bureaucratic corruption 
 
                                                 
32
 (1.418-.578)/1.418. 
33
 (.903-.795)/.903. 
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with FBC one standard deviation above the mean (B.CORR + 1SD), average mean regression 
slope for countries with mean levels of bureaucratic corruption (B.CORR mean), and the 
predicted regression slope for countries with FBC one standard deviation below the mean 
(B.CORR -1SD). In countries where bureaucratic corruption is less frequent (B.CORR - 
1SD), average mean institutional trust is higher, but the negative effect of corruption 
experience is stronger. In contrast, in countries where bureaucratic corruption is more 
frequent (B.CORR + 1SD), average mean institutional trust is lower, and the effect of 
corruption experience on institutional trust is weaker. Why?  
What these results suggest is first of all that citizen trust in political institutions to a certain 
extent is contingent on the prevalence of bureaucratic corruption within that same system.
34
 
Now, the individual-level effect of corruption experience on institutional trust in countries 
where bureaucratic corruption is frequent is much weaker compared to in countries where 
bureaucratic corruption is less frequent. I argue that a plausible explanation for this has to do 
with citizen expectations of procedural justice and equal treatment in encounters with public 
services and public officials. In countries where citizens are not used to having to pay bribes 
in order to process documents, receive fair treatment, etc., individuals may not have very high 
expectations of being treated fairly and equally. In contrast, citizens of countries where 
bureaucratic corruption is less prevalent, citizens may expect more of the system. In these 
countries, experiencing corruption may to a larger degree stand in contrast to initial 
expectations of high standards and honesty in the public administration system, resulting in 
destructive consequences for individual trust in democratic institutions.  
I argue that because the effects of corruption experience are negative in all cases (although 
extremely weak in countries where bureaucratic corruption is frequent), these results do not 
indicate that corruption is an accepted practice viewed as legitimate just because corruption is 
rampant, as the cultural hypothesis discussed in Chapter 1 suggested. The implications of this 
finding will be further discussed in Chapter 5.  
Moving to Model 5b, variations in the perceived level of institutional effectiveness was found 
to explain some of the variation in the effects of perceptions of political corruption on 
institutional trust. The regression coefficient for the interaction term is in this case also 
                                                 
34
 The main effect of frequency of bureaucratic corruption cannot be interpreted separately from the interaction 
effect in Model 5a. However, the figure illustrates that average mean institutional trust is higher in countries 
were bureaucratic corruption is less frequent, which is also indicated by the covariance between the intercept and 
the random slope in Model 5a.   
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positive, which indicates that the effect of perceptions of political corruption is weaker in 
countries with higher levels of institutional effectiveness. Figure 4.2 illustrates this 
relationship. 
Figure 4.2 Institutional trust as a function of perceived political corruption and institutional effectiveness 
 
The effect of perceptions of political corruption to a stronger extent negatively affects 
institutional trust in countries with poor-functioning institutions (GOV -1SD). This indicates 
that individual evaluations of short-term policy outputs are more important for institutional 
legitimacy in countries with poorly functioning institutions. The cross-level interaction was 
not, however, statistically significant when estimating the same model after excluding the 6 
countries that were not self-weighted. This result should therefore be interpreted with caution, 
as it is beyond the scope of the thesis to establish whether this is due to not being able to 
incorporate weights that make individual country samples (of these six countries) 
representative and equalize the sample sizes of each country, or the elimination of a large 
number of observations at both levels of analysis.  
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4.3.3 Analysis II – Satisfaction with Democracy 
Table 4.3 presents the results for the effects of corruption on the satisfaction with democracy 
dimension. In the following, I discuss the results from Models 1-3, and compare the results to 
the results from Analysis I. The average mean satisfaction with democracy across countries is 
on average about 10 points higher than average mean institutional trust.  
We expected that the effects of corruption would be weaker on the satisfaction with 
democracy dimension, than on the institutional trust dimension. The results from Model 1 
suggest that this was indeed a reasonable expectation, with the exception of the regression 
coefficients for perceptions of corruption among public officials. This is discussed below. The 
main effects of corruption experiences, and perceptions of political corruption, are still 
negative and highly significant, but the effects are weaker as compared to Analysis I. 
Corruption permissiveness and satisfaction with the incumbent government (M2) have largely 
the same influence on the effects of corruption experiences and perceptions of political 
corruption as they did in Analysis I. Controlling for corruption permissiveness to a certain 
(but very little) extent weakens the effect of corruption experience (supporting H3), and 
controlling for satisfaction with incumbent government attenuates both the effects of 
experience and perceptions of political corruption (supporting H4). Again, it is satisfaction 
with the incumbent government that exerts the strongest effects on the corruption predictors‟ 
effects on satisfaction with democracy. Also consistent with Analysis I, the dummy variables 
for perception of corruption among public officials remain largely unaffected by the inclusion 
of these predictors.  
The two dummy variables that are supposed to capture individual perceptions of corruption 
among public officials have changed signs in the satisfaction with performance analysis. It 
seems as though perceptions of the degree to which public officials are corrupt decrease 
institutional trust (Analysis I), but increase satisfaction with democracy. At the same time, the 
regression coefficient for perceptions of corruption in government continues to be negative 
and highly significant. These results give rise to several questions. First, are citizens of Latin 
America and the Caribbean satisfied with democracy although they perceive corruption 
among public officials to be common? Or, do some individuals confuse the satisfaction with 
performance dimension with support for democracy, that is, the normative dimension of 
legitimacy?
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Table 4.3 Un-weighted parameter estimates for multilevel models on Satisfaction with Democracy (n=32777); standard errors in parenthesis  
Predictor variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept 56.251***  (1.421) 56.310***  (1.425) 56.306***  (1.425) 56.316***  (1.429) 56.107*** (1.228) 
Corruption experience -1.047***   (.172) -.855***     (.166) -.889***     (.167) -.826***     (.167)  -.826***    (.166) 
Corruption common 2.326***    (.318) 2.301***    (.305) 2.280***    (.306) 2.275***    (.308) 2.273***   (.308) 
Corruption very common -.035           (.314) .708**        (.302) .649*          (.303) .611            (.645) .604           (.644) 
Political corruption  -3.545***   (.064) -2.117***   (.067) -2.118***   (.067) -2.104***   (.215) -2.123***  (.200) 
Corruption permissiveness  -.780**       (.299) -.739*         (.301)  -.645*         (.299)  -.646*        (.299)  
Incumbent government  -6.798***   (.127) -6.794***   (.127) -6.624***   (.128) -6.618***  (.128) 
Male   .523*          (.213) .517*           (.213) .513*         (.212) 
Age   .020**        (.007) .022**         (.007) .022**       (.007) 
Education   .021            (.028) .036             (.027) .036           (.027) 
      
Institutional Performance     1.888**     (.573) 
GDP     -.178          (.273) 
Institutional Performance*Political 
corruption 
    .170*         (.039) 
Variance components      
Individual-level 397.983      (3.110) 365.702     (2.858) 365.578     (2.857) 361.034       (2.823) 361.036    (1.235) 
Country-level 46.153       (14.018) 46.443       (14.10) 46.478       (14.10) 46.706         (14.176) 34.302      (10.890) 
      
Corruption very common    7.360           (2.578) 7.342        (2.572) 
Political corruption    .958             (.314) .810          (.276) 
Cov(very_ political)    -.352            (.640) -.121         (.600) 
Cov (very_intercept)    3.215          (4.408) 5.366        (3.931) 
Cov (political_intercept)    1.794          (1.558) .056          (1.235) 
-2LL -144674.99 -143290.33 -143290.58 -143133.95 -143129.44 
† p <.10; *p <.05; **p <.01; *** p <.001; * not significant when incorporating weights (GLLAMM). 
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Alternatively, if we interpret the corruption measure as an indicator of individual perceptions 
of low-level corruption, is it so that the degree to which lower-level officials are corrupt does 
not negatively affect the way individual evaluate the general functioning of democracy, 
although perceptions of corruption in government do?  Another possibility is that the 
corruption in government indicator to a greater extent reflects the performance of the 
incumbent government, not so much an evaluation of the extent to which top officials and 
politicians are, in general, corrupt or not. But why then, does the indicator measuring 
individual corruption experience continue to be negative? These questions will be subject to 
further discussion in Chapter 5, but it seems as though the indicator tapping into perceptions 
of corruption among public officials may be a vague non-interpretable indicator that reflects 
much more than just perceptions of corruption. 
In Model 3, controlling for gender, age, and education changes somewhat the effects of 
corruption experience (which is intensified) and perceptions of corruption among public 
officials (weakened), but not very strongly. Results do not support H5 in this analysis either.  
Did the effects of corruption on satisfaction with democracy vary across countries? 
When examining the degree to which the effects of corruption on satisfaction with democracy 
varied across countries, I found that the dummy variable corruption very common, and 
perceptions of corruption in government, had significant random slopes. The random slope of 
corruption very common indicates that in 95 % of the countries, the regression slope for this 
variable will vary between 5.92 and -4.70.
35
 The immensely wide random slope makes this 
difficult to interpret, and suggests that the estimated average effect of perceptions of 
corruption among public officials on institutional trust is not very precise. It may well indicate 
that, as has previously been discussed, it could be questioned whether this item actually 
measures the same underlying construct in all countries. Because the measurement validity of 
the indicator is difficult to establish, this results could be a “false” suggestion of a random 
variation in the effect of corruption on satisfaction with democracy. Alternatively, it might 
reflect that the satisfaction with democracy measure in some countries is confused with 
support for democracy. The factor analysis showed that, on average, satisfaction with 
democracy distributed high loadings on the same dimension as evaluations of the economy 
(which clearly are performance indicators).   
                                                 
35
 √            95 % confidence interval constructed: .699±1.96*2.71. 
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It is reasonable to argue that in countries where the satisfaction with democracy measure is 
interpreted as an indicator of performance, citizen perceptions of corruption among public 
officials may decrease their satisfaction, while in countries where this indicator in large is 
interpreted as a system support indicator, the positive regression coefficient may reflect that 
citizens are dissatisfied democrats, as has previously been found to be the case in some 
countries. However, these are only speculations. Further research on the sources of 
satisfaction with democracy, and on the meaning of corruption across countries needs to be 
undertaken if we want to make valid inferences about the relationship between perceptions of 
corruption and satisfaction with democracy. If anything, the analysis demonstrates the 
limitations to relying solely on corruption perceptions when studying corruption cross-
nationally.  
The random slope for perceptions of corruption in government indicates that in 95 % of the 
countries in the region, the regression slope will vary between -4.366 and .158, also very 
difficult relationship to interpret. When testing whether level of corruption or governance 
could explain some of the variation in the effects of perceptions of political corruption, 
institutional effectiveness was found to explain some of the variance, similar to Analysis I. 
Figure 4.3 illustrates this graphically.   
Explaining variation in the effects of corruption across countries 
Neither level of political corruption nor the frequency of bureaucratic corruption could 
significantly explain some of the variation in the random slopes of the corruption perceptions 
indicators. However, and similar to Analysis I, institutional effectiveness significantly (p<.05) 
explained some of the variation in the slope for perceptions of political corruption. In fact, the 
Level-2 slope variance decreased by 15 %. When excluding the six non-self-weighted 
countries, the cross-level interaction was still significant. The interaction between institutional 
effectiveness and political corruption illustrates a similar relationship to the relationship found 
in Analysis I. The relationship is illustrated in Figure 4.3.  
The figure shows predicted regression slopes for perception of corruption in government in 
countries with mean levels of institutional effectiveness (GOV mean), countries with level of 
effectiveness one standard deviation above the mean level of governance (GOV +1SD), and 
countries with level of effectiveness one standard deviation below the mean (GOV -1SD). 
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Figure 4.3 Satisfaction with democracy as a function of perception of political corruption and institutional 
performance 
 
The overall effects of perceptions of political institutions on satisfaction with democracy are 
weaker, but the picture is the same. Perceptions of political corruption are to a stronger degree 
related to satisfaction with democracy in countries where institutional performance is low, 
compared to countries where institutional effectiveness is high. Thus, perceptions of the 
current administration‟s efforts at combating political corruption, is a stronger predictor of 
diffuse support in countries where institutional performance is low. Summing up, Analysis II 
gives no support to H6 or H7, but partial support to H8.  
4.3.4 Analysis III – Normative Support for Democracy 
Table 4.4 presents the results for the most diffuse legitimacy dimension of them all – the 
normative support for democracy. Compared to the results for institutional trust and 
satisfaction with democracy, the average mean normative support for democracy is even 
higher across Latin American and Caribbean countries (above 70 on the 0 to 100 scale). 
Support for the fundamental norms of democracy is without a doubt strongly ingrained among 
citizens in the Latin American region.  
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Table 4.4  Un-weighted parameter estimates from multilevel models on Normative Support for Democracy (n=33534); standard errors in parenthesis   
Predictor variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept 71.319*** (1.432) 71.316*** (1.432) 71.165*** (1.435)  71.099*** (1.438)  71.086*** (1.451) 
Corruption experience -.120          (.191) -.190          (.193) -.569**      (.193) -.569**       (.193) -.529**       (.193) 
Corruption common  2.808***  (.355) 2.810***   (.354) 2.320***   (.354) 2.320***    (.354) 2.328***    (.356) 
Corruption very common 3.809***   (.350) 3.794***   (.351) 3.280***   (.350) 3.280***    (.350) 3.341***    (.641) 
Political corruption -.206**      (.071) -.221**      (.078) -.310***    (.077) -.310***     (.077) -.261           (.180) 
Corruption permissiveness  .938**       (.348) .686*         (.348)  .687*          (.348) .734*          (.347) 
Incumbent Government  .046           (.147) .070           (.149) .069            (.069) .007            (.148) 
Male    1.467***  (.246) 1.467***    (.245) 1.442***    (.246) 
Age    .013          (.008) .013            (.008) .013            (.008) 
Education   .568***     (.032) .568***      (.032) .570***      (.032) 
      
CPI     1.571         (4.137)  
GDP     .217            (.287) 
CPI*Public off. very corrupt     -1.185*       (1.451) 
      
Variance components      
Individual-level 506.137     (3.910) 506.055    (3.910) 500.468    (3.867) 500.468     (3.867) 497.029   (3.843) 
Country-level 46.803      (14.218) 46.800     (14.218) 47.027     (14.285) 47.163       (15.024) 48.033     (15.649) 
Corruption very common    8.450         (3.070) 6.523       (2.494) 
Political corruption    .602           (.221) .598         (.219) 
Covariance (very percg)    .621           (.595) .052         (.571) 
Covariance (very cons)    -4.906        (4.427) -3.251      (4.427) 
Covariance (percg cons)    1.624         (1.49) 2.420       (1.497) 
      
-2LL -152042.95 -152040.39 -151859.89 -151782.44 -151778.66 
† p <.10; *p <.05; **p <.01; *** p <.001; * not significant when incorporating weights (GLLAMM).                                             
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There are some inconsistencies as regards for the statistical significance of the fixed effects in 
Models 1-3 when compared with the GLLAMM estimates (Appendix C). In Model 3, the 
coefficients for corruption experience, perceptions of political, and corruption permissiveness 
did not achieve statistical significance when sample sizes were equalized and population 
weights are incorporated. Other results are consistent, however. 
The effects of corruption experiences and perceptions were expected to be much weaker on 
the normative dimension compared to the two other legitimacy dimensions. Results strongly 
support this expectation. Support for democratic participation rights is little, if to any extent, 
moved by individual experience with corruption and perceptions of political corruption, even 
when solely including corruption predictors (M1). Although negatively signed, these 
indicators do not significantly affect individual‟s normative support for democracy, on 
average. Individuals who perceive corruption among public officials to be very common or 
common, however, are significantly more supportive of democratic participation rights than 
individuals that perceive corruption among public officials to be uncommon or not at all 
common. The finding greatly resembles the results from Analysis II on satisfaction with 
democracy, which again might that satisfaction with democracy is, in the Latin American and 
Caribbean region, confounded with support for democracy, on average. 
Controlling for individual corruption permissiveness and satisfaction with incumbent 
government (M2) does not in this case have any noteworthy impact on the regression slopes 
of the corruption predictors. Citizen support for democracy in its most abstract form is, on 
average, little affected by the same indicators that were found to have significant impacts on 
the other two dimensions. Thus, citizen normative support for democracy seems to have 
different sources than citizen trust in institutions and satisfaction with democracy. It seems 
that whether or not individuals acknowledge that all citizens have the same participation 
rights is to a greater extent driven by individual‟s socio-demographic traits (M3). Not only 
does the inclusion of sex, age, and education contribute to a significantly better model fit 
(p<.001), both sex and education are positive and highly significant. Males and higher 
educated individuals are thus more likely to support fundamental democratic participation 
rights.  
Summing up the results from Models 1-3, no support is given to the hypotheses that 
corruption experience and perceptions negatively affect normative support for democracy (H1 
and H2). Partial support is given to H2alt, which expected that individuals who perceived 
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high levels of corruption were more supportive of the normative dimension of democracy. 
This was not the case for perceptions of political corruption, and the reasons for this is 
discussed further in Chapter 5. However, the fact that the effects of corruption experience and 
perceptions of political corruption were too weak to achieve statistical significance give 
further support to H1A, and partial support to H2A. Neither H3 (corruption permissiveness) 
nor H4 (satisfaction with incumbent government) are supported by Analysis III. Finally, 
support is in this analysis given to H5. On the normative dimension, sex and education 
strongly determine support for democratic participation rights.  
Did the effects of corruption on normative support for democracy vary across 
countries? 
The effects of perceptions of political corruption and corruption very common on citizens‟ 
normative support for democracy were found to vary significantly across countries. 
Specifying both variables as random resulted in a highly significant improvement of the 
model (p<.001) in both cases.  
In Model 4, the country-level variance component for corruption very common indicates that 
the regression slope varied between -2.424 and 8.984 in 95 % of the countries. Thus, although 
the average individual-level effect of perceiving high levels of corruption among public 
officials is positive, the random slope variation suggests that in some countries, the 
relationship is negative. Again, this is a very wide interval. As previously has been discussed, 
the possibility exists that we are not measuring the same underlying construct across 
countries. However, given that we could establish beyond all doubt that the measure of 
perceptions of corruption among public officials was invariant across countries this result 
need not be all that surprising. In countries where democracy is perceived to go hand in hand 
with corruption, citizens may be willing to give up democratic rights and freedoms in order to 
curb corruption. As shown in Chapter 3, a relatively large percentage of respondents 
answered positively to the question of whether a military coup was justified if corruption 
levels were very high. But, again, these are only speculations.  
Explaining variations in the effects of corruption on normative support for democracy  
Institutional effectiveness and frequency of bureaucratic corruption did not significantly 
explain variation in the effects of corruption on the normative dimension of democracy, 
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however. Level of corruption as measured by the CPI index, however, was found to 
significantly explain some of the variation in the effects of corruption very common. Figure 
4.4 illustrates this relationship.  
Figure 4.4 Normative support for democracy as a function of perception of high levels of corruption 
among public officials and level of political corruption (CPI) 
 
Average mean normative support for democracy is, first of all, higher in countries where the 
prevalence of corruption is perceived to be lower than the mean (CPI +1SD). In countries 
where corruption is perceived to be rampant (CPI -1SD), average mean normative support for 
democracy is lower, but the positive effect of perceiving high levels of corruption is stronger. 
What, if anything, does this tell us? This could indicate that, in countries where corruption is 
rampant, citizens who recognize this are dissatisfied democrats, while in countries where 
corruption is less widespread, the difference in average support for democratic participation 
rights between corruption-perceiving individuals and the rest is not very large. In countries 
where corruption levels are low and support for the normative dimension of democracy is 
high, corruption is not necessarily a strong predictor of this kind of support. 
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It cannot be established beyond doubt that these relationships are not in fact spurious at the 
aggregate level. As previously discussed, the between-country variation in level of corruption 
as measured by the CPI may reflect other characteristics such as democratic development, for 
example. Thus, it is difficult to argue that it is a country‟s level of corruption that causes the 
variation in effect of perceptions of corruption on normative support for democracy. 
Moreover, accounting for between-country variation in level of corruption as measured by the 
CPI the Level-2 slope variance of perception of corruption among public officials decreased 
by 22 %,
36
 but the interval within which the slope is assumed to vary is in Model 5 still very 
wide (from 8.339 to -1.657). This indicates that there is still a lot of variance left to explain. 
4.3.5 Summary of key results 
Analysis of three separate legitimacy dimensions showed that the ways in which individual 
corruption experience and perceptions are related to legitimacy, varies according to the 
diffuseness of the legitimacy dimension. Individual corruption experience was negatively 
related to trust in institutions and satisfaction with democracy, but not significantly related to 
the normative support for democracy. Largely the same relationship was found for individual 
perceptions of political corruption. The effects of corruption experiences and perceptions 
taper off as legitimacy dimensions become more diffuse.  
Results for perceptions of corruption among public officials painted a somewhat different 
picture, as individuals who perceived high levels of corruption was found to be more satisfied 
with democracy, and more supportive of democratic participation rights. Results illustrate not 
only that corruption perceptions capture something that is not straightforward to interpret, and 
which may be the result of a variety of factors and beliefs more or less independent of 
“actual” corruption. Moreover, it could be questioned whether the satisfaction with 
democracy dimension in some countries is confounded with support for democracy. 
Regarding cross-level interactions, a country‟s a country‟s frequency of bureaucratic 
corruption was found to significantly explain variations in the effects of corruption on 
institutional trust. Institutional effectiveness was found to explain variations in the effects of 
perceptions of political corruption on both the institutional trust and satisfaction with 
democracy dimension. On the normative dimension, level of corruption as measured by the 
                                                 
36
 (8.450-6.523)/8.450. 
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CPI index explained a small part of the variation in the effects of perceptions of corruption 
among public officials on the normative support for democracy. In most cases, however, 
substantial Level-2 variance was left unexplained, which calls for further analysis of country-
level influences on individual-level relationships. The results, supported hypotheses, and 
implications are discussed in the next chapter. 
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5 Delegitimizing Democracy? 
In Latin America, corruption scandals involving sitting presidents have haunted many of the 
countries in the region since the time of their transitions to democracy (Morris and Blake 
2009, 1). The perception that corruption has increased during democratization has led scholars 
to argue that democracy creates new means by which corrupt politicians may abuse their 
power for personal gain or for the gain of their political parties (Weyland 1998). In the face of 
widespread perceptions that corruption has been on the rise since Latin America‟s democratic 
transitions, and in light of the tendency for international research to portray corruption as a 
threat to democratic development and consolidation, this thesis has analyzed the impact that 
individual corruption perceptions and experiences have on attitudes toward democracy in 23 
Latin American countries. In the following, I sum up and discuss the hypotheses and main 
findings of the thesis. Afterwards, I consider the theoretical implications of the results, as well 
as some of their implications for democracy in the Latin American region. A final section 
discusses recommendations for future cross-national survey research on corruption and 
democracy. 
5.1 Discussing Results and Hypotheses 
The main findings of the thesis show that, at the individual level, perceptions of and 
experiences with corruption negatively and significantly decrease the legitimacy of 
government. The degree to which individual corruption perceptions and experiences affect 
legitimacy, however, varies according to the level of diffuseness in the legitimacy dimension. 
When moving from the institutional dimension to more diffuse dimensions of legitimacy, the 
effects of corruption generally taper off. In the following paragraphs, I discuss the degree to 
which the analyses provide support for key hypotheses concerning the relationships between 
corruption and democratic legitimacy, as presented in Chapter 4. 
The first hypothesis (H1) predicted that experiences with low-level corruption would weaken 
the level of trust in institutions, as well as decrease the overall satisfaction with and the 
normative support for democracy. This hypothesis is partially supported by the analyses. 
Individuals who were solicited a bribe in their dealings with public officials and public 
institutions during the year prior to the survey were significantly less trusting in political 
institutions, and significantly less satisfied with democracy when compared to individuals that 
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had not experienced corruption during the same time period. Experience with corruption did 
not, however, significantly affect citizens‟ normative support for democracy. Moreover, the 
effects that actual experiences with corruption have on the satisfaction with democracy were 
much weaker than the effects on institutional trust. This supports the expectation that 
individual experiences with corruption have far weaker effects on the more diffuse 
dimensions of legitimacy when compared to more specific dimensions (H1A). 
The finding is important for several reasons. Comparing the effects of real experiences with 
corruption, as opposed to mere perceptions of it, to some extent has been the crux of the 
matter in the thesis. The finding that corruption experience is negatively related to all three 
legitimacy dimensions provides for additional empirical evidence to the notion that actual 
corruption has corrosive effects on democratic legitimacy. Indeed, previous research found 
this same relationship in 4 and 6 Latin American countries (Seligson 2002, 2006), while other 
research found this relationship in Mexico (Morris 2008; Morris and Klesner 2010). By 
extending the analysis to 23 countries in the Latin American region, this thesis has 
demonstrated that the negative relationship between corruption and legitimacy is not peculiar 
to the few countries where this relationship has previously been examined. Throughout the 
Latin American region, citizens who have experienced corruption are, on average, less 
trusting in institutions and less satisfied with democracy. This indicates that low-level 
corruption is not a welcomed practice among Latin American citizens. However, the fact that 
the relationship failed to achieve statistical significance on the normative dimension of 
legitimacy shows that Latin Americans distinguish between the various dimensions of 
legitimacy, and do not necessarily blame the principles of democracy for the existence of 
corruption. 
The effects of corruption were, however, found to be stronger in countries where bureaucratic 
corruption is less frequent. As touched on in Chapter 4, I argue that this finding is best 
interpreted and explained when taking into account citizen expectations of government and 
institutional performance in countries with high levels of institutional performance versus 
those with lower performance levels. As pointed out by Rose and Mishler (2010), citizens 
may to a greater extent expect high standards and fair treatment in countries where public 
integrity is high. Therefore, when citizens encounter corrupt practices within a system that on 
a general level is considered to function relatively well, the violation of their expectations of 
high standards and fair procedures may produce and “over-reaction” (Rose and Mishler 2010, 
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162) that leads to stronger corrosive effects on the political system as a whole. By contrast, 
encountering corrupt practices may not be a big surprise for average citizens in those 
countries that exhibit lower levels of trust in political institutions and higher expectations of 
corruption. Nevertheless, the mean effect of experiences with corruption was negative even in 
those countries where bureaucratic corruption was frequent. This finding lends additional 
support to the argument that corruption is not the accepted norm in the region, despite the fact 
that its incidence is frequent. 
Moving on to corruption perceptions, the second hypothesis (H2) suggested that citizens who 
perceive the existence of high levels of corruption would tend to have lower levels of 
institutional trust, satisfaction with performance, and normative support for democracy. As 
was the case with corruption experiences, the hypothesized effects of corruption perceptions 
on legitimacy were also expected to be stronger on more specific dimensions (H2A). 
However, the results are somewhat mixed for corruption perceptions. Therefore, I will 
provide a separate discussion on the results of the two indicators for corruption perceptions.  
The results for the effects of perceptions of political corruption strongly confirm both H2 and 
H2A. Increased dissatisfaction with the current administration‟s efforts at combating 
corruption in government led to decreased levels of institutional trust and satisfaction with 
democracy. Similar to the results for corruption experience, the effect of perceptions of 
political corruption was rendered insignificant on the normative dimension. This indicates 
that, insofar as individual evaluations of the short-term performance of the current 
administration (in terms of curbing political corruption) affect institutional trust and 
satisfaction with democracy, it does not affect citizen adherence to the principles upon which 
democracy rests. Thus, in terms of perceptions of political corruption, the results confirm both 
H2 and H2A and resemble those found for experiences with corruption. 
Analysis also looked into the contextual effect that institutional performance has on the 
relationship between perceptions of political corruption and legitimacy. The findings show 
that perceptions of widespread political corruption negatively impacted institutional 
legitimacy and satisfaction with democracy most strongly in countries where institutional 
effectiveness is low. This supports the expectation a country‟s institutional performance will 
affect the extent to which corruption is related to legitimacy, as defined in hypothesis eight 
(H8). The fact that average mean institutional trust and satisfaction with democracy was much 
lower in countries where institutional performance was low, as compared to in countries 
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where institutional performance was high supports the Lipset-Easton notion that institutional 
effectiveness contributes to democratic legitimacy.  
However, the indicator on the perception of corruption among public officials has proven to 
be the one that goes against the grain of expected trends. On the institutional trust dimension, 
individuals that perceived high levels of corruption among public officials were significantly 
less trusting in institutions when compared to individuals that perceive corruption to be less 
common. This picture changed when analyzing satisfaction with democracy and the 
normative support for democracy. While the effect of perceptions of political corruption 
continued to be negative on the other two dimensions, citizens that perceived corruption 
among public officials to be either common or very common were significantly more satisfied 
with democracy, and more supportive of democratic participation rights. In Chapter 4, I 
suggested that this seemingly contradictory position might result when some citizens confuse 
the satisfaction with democracy dimension with actual support for democracy. However, this 
confusion should also have prevailed for corruption experience and perceptions of political 
corruption. Therefore, it is difficult to arrive at a “conclusive” interpretation of this 
contradictory finding, and it might in fact be the product of several factors. Intuitively, one 
would expect to find negative citizen evaluations of the political performance of the system 
(here, the general level of corruption among public officials) to coincide with a decreased 
satisfaction with democracy. After all, this was found to be the case in both experiences with 
corruption and perceptions of political corruption.  
The finding that corruption perceptions increase citizens‟ normative support for democracy 
may be interpreted as citizens being dissatisfied democrats. This interpretation corroborates 
the findings of Rose, Shin, and Mauro (1999), thus indicating that the normative support for 
democracy is associated with factors such as honesty in government and an unwillingness to 
tolerate corrupt acts within a democratic context. This is consistent with the hypothesized 
relationship in H2alt.  
I argue that it is almost impossible to assess the degree to which the positive relationship 
between perceptions of corruption and the satisfaction with democracy is the result of (i) the 
satisfaction with democracy indicator being confused with support for democracy, or (ii) the 
„perceptions of corruption‟ indicator actually reflecting a whole range of other factors that are 
difficult to discern because of the vagueness of the question‟s wording. Indeed, it could be 
both. However, both perceptions of political performance and the experiences with corruption 
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„behave‟ just as expected. Therefore, I argue that it is more plausible that the indicator which 
measures people‟s perceptions of corruption among public officials is too vague to serve as a 
basis for accurate interpretation. In relation to this precise issue, it is therefore difficult to 
accurately interpret the cross-level interaction between level of political corruption as 
measured by the CPI and perceptions of corruption among public officials. The most plausible 
interpretation, I argue, is that the difference between individuals who perceive high levels of 
corruption versus those that do not, may be of less importance when studying determinants of 
normative support for democracy in countries where corruption is less widespread as 
compared to countries where it is widespread. But again, these relationships need to be 
subject to further empirical scrutiny, preferably by making use of analytical techniques that 
solves the problems of measurement variance, or by undertaking case studies. But most 
importantly, the results for corruption perceptions underline the importance of improving 
those indicators that attempt to measure such perceptions. 
5.2 Theoretical Implications 
Results indicate that proximate experiences with corruption and evaluations of the prevalence 
of corruption are related to diffuse political support, although not related to the most diffuse 
type of support, conceptualized as citizens‟ normative support for democracy. Obviously, the 
thesis was not set out uncover the most important sources of various dimensions of 
legitimacy. Rather, the thesis compared the effects
37
 that proximate experiences with 
corruption and evaluations of political performance (perceived corruption) had on different 
types of diffuse support,
 38
 and how these effects varied with the institutional performance and 
level of corruption of the countries included in the analysis. 
Institutional theory postulated that political trust and support are consequences of a regime‟s 
political and economic performance, and that proximate evaluations of and experiences with 
                                                 
37
 As has been discussed previously, the causal direction is difficult to establish. The analyzed models assumed 
that corruption experiences and perceptions are explanatory variables that influence political trust and support. It 
should, however, be reiterated that the thesis makes no attempt to establish the causal direction of the 
relationships. It is highly plausible that endogeneity exists in the measures, and that corruption perceptions are 
functions of individual trust in and support for democracy, and that these effects are mutually reinforcing.  
38
 It seems necessary to clarify here that, although “institutional trust” was referred to as the most specific 
dimension, it is still conceived of as a type of diffuse support (Easton 1975). However, it is more specific that the 
other two dimensions, but not as specific as support for incumbent government, which is what Easton (1975) 
classified as “specific” support. 
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regime performance are important when citizens evaluate their support for democracy and its 
institutions. Analyses of three dimensions of legitimacy, give partial support to this claim.  
The thesis has shown that diffuse political support is not totally independent of short-term 
outputs and performance, as was argued by Easton (1975). However, because we have 
distinguished between three types of diffuse support, the results are not unambiguous. 
Disaggregating legitimacy and analyzing different dimensions showed that although some 
types of diffuse support are contingent on proximate experiences and short-term performance 
(institutional trust and satisfaction with democracy), this is not the case for the most diffuse 
legitimacy dimension; support for participation rights that strike at the very heart of 
democracy.  
Another important finding is that, when including cross-level interactions in the models, it 
became clear how the average mean individual institutional trust, satisfaction with 
democracy, and normative support for democracy was higher in countries perceived to be 
more effective in terms of institutional performance, and in countries where corruption was 
less widespread. Although this is a cross-sectional study analyzing data from one single year, 
it is possible to argue that the results support the Lipset-Easton notion that effective 
institutions will enjoy popular support, and that pro-longed effectiveness will increase 
legitimacy.  
As previously argued, the result that proximate experience with corruption to be a stronger 
predictor of institutional trust in countries where bureaucratic corruption was less frequent 
(i.e., with overall better political performance), might indicate that citizen expectations of 
public administration systems are higher in countries where public integrity is high. Thus, the 
thesis‟ results support the notion that citizen trust in institutions will decrease if performance 
falls short of citizen expectations (Miller and Listhaug 1999). Perceptions of short-term policy 
outputs in terms  of curbing corruption was more important in countries where institutional 
effectiveness was lower (i.e., with overall poorer political performance). This may indicate 
that diffuse support is to a greater extent contingent on the incumbent government‟s political 
performance in these countries. This is not surprising, as one can argue that ineffective 
institutions is plausibly the result of poor performance of former governments. If incumbent 
governments are unable to deliver „the goods‟ and curb, this will have negative consequences 
for citizens‟ trust in the broader political system, as hypothesized by Easton (1975).  
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Overall, I argue that the culturalist argument has little merit in the Latin American and 
Caribbean regions. Although findings for corruption perceptions were somewhat 
contradictory, experience with corruption and democratic attitudes were negatively related to 
one another, which suggests that corruption is not the accepted norm in the Latin American 
region although it might be frequent in some countries. 
5.3 Implications for Democracy in Latin America 
The findings of this thesis indicate that Latin American citizens, at the very least, distinguish 
between the normative dimension of legitimacy and the institutional dimension of legitimacy, 
and that corruption is not delegitimizing democracy, at least not support for its most abstract 
form. Support for fundamental democratic norms is highly ingrained among citizens across all 
countries in the region, and this support seems little moved by individual corruption 
experiences and perceptions. Regardless of how salient corruption perceptions are, or how 
frequent bureaucratic corruption is, citizen support for the rights that strike right at the heart 
of democracy stands strong. What is more, it seems as though citizens that perceive high 
levels of corruption in fact are dissatisfied democrats.  
At the same time, the fact that corruption experience and perceptions of political corruption 
are shown to decrease institutional trust and satisfaction with democracy does indicate that 
efforts at lowering either participation in corruption or perceptions of corruption would 
heighten the levels of legitimacy throughout the region. Corruption is clearly not the accepted 
norm in the Latin American region, and increasing levels of corruption and corrupt practices 
could have severe effects for democratic legitimacy in the long run. Stated differently, while 
citizens of Latin American countries do not accept corruption as a part of democracy, and 
despite their strong adherence to the principles of democratic participation, we cannot dismiss 
the possibility that prolonged dissatisfaction with democratic institutions and the workings of 
democracy can lead to increased support for alternative regime types.  
5.4 Recommendations for future research on corruption 
Research on corruption is, to a certain point, bound to rely upon elite and mass perceptions of 
the prevalence of corruption within different countries and among different societal domains. 
However, there are some important limitations to studying perceptions of corruption, not only 
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across countries with different cultures and varying political and historical trajectories, but 
also across individuals belonging to different societal groups within each country, where one 
is likely to find variations in interpretations about what constitutes a corrupt act. The 
difficulty in assessing the cross-cultural comparability of corruption begs for approaches that 
measure corruption by moving beyond surveys that ask individuals about their perceptions of 
“corruption.” If we want to make valid inferences about the causes and consequences of 
corruption, it is necessary to develop measurements that make explicit references to acts that 
are conventionally considered to be corrupt. In addition, it is important that survey research 
develops measurements that are able to distinguish between political and bureaucratic 
corruption, either by references to specific public actors or to specific institutions. As Miller 
(2006) suggests, research must ask a lot of questions, ones that help clarify the roles and 
clarify the acts. Doing this within a framework that makes questions meaningful and 
understandable to average citizens would enhance the possibilities for establishing a cross-
national comparison of the consequences and causes of corruption. 
The thesis has provided some early evidence on how the differential effects of corruption on 
democratic legitimacy vary across countries according to differences in the regimes‟ political 
performances. Future research should continue to explore the contextual effects that macro-
level indicators have on individual-level relationships between corruption and legitimacy, 
preferably by using Bayesian estimation in order to correct for measurement variance and 
other potential bias. 
 
 
 
85 
 
References 
Adcock, Robert, and David Collier. 2001. Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for 
Qualitative and Quantitative Research. American Political Science Review 95 
(03):529-546. 
Anderson, C. J., and Y. V. Tverdova. 2003. Corruption, political allegiances, and attitudes 
toward government in contemporary democracies. American Journal of Political 
Science 47 (1):91-109. 
Anderson, Christopher, and Christine Guillory. 1997. Political Institutions and Satisfaction 
with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems. 
American Political Science Review 91 (1):66-81. 
Andvig, Jens Chr., and Odd-Helge Fjeldstad. 2001. Corruption: A Review of Contemporary 
Research. Chr. Michelsens Institute. 
Bailey, John. 2009. Corruption and Democratic Governability. In Corruption & Democracy 
in Latin America, edited by C. H. Blake and S. D. Morris. Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press. 
Bailey, John., and Pablo. Paras. 2006. Perceptions and Attitudes about Corruption and 
Democracy in Mexico. Mexican Studies / Estudios Mexicanos 22 (1):57-82. 
Bickel, Robert. 2007. Multilevel Analysis for Applied Research. It's Just Regression: The 
Guildford Press. 
Blake, Charles H. 2009. Public Attitudes toward Corruption. In Corruption & Democracy in 
Latin America, edited by C. H. Blake and S. D. Morris. Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press. 
Booth, John A., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. The legitimacy puzzle in Latin America : 
political support and democracy in eight nations. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Canache, D., and M. E. Allison. 2005. Perceptions of political corruption in Latin American 
democracies. Latin American Politics and Society 47 (3):91-111. 
Canache, Damarys, Jeffery J. Mondak, and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2001. Meaning and 
Measurement in Cross-National Research on Satisfaction with Democracy. Public 
Opinion Quarterly 65 (4):506-528. 
Carle, Adam. 2009. Fitting multilevel models in complex survey data with design weights: 
Recommendations. BMC Medical Research Methodology 9 (1):49. 
86 
 
Chang, E. C. C., and Y. H. Chu. 2006. Corruption and trust: Exceptionalism in Asian 
democracies? Journal of Politics 68 (2):259-271. 
Dahl, Robert Alan. 1971. Polyarchy : participation and opposition. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Davis, C. L., R. A. Camp, and K. M. Coleman. 2004. The influence of party systems on 
citizens' perceptions of corruption and electoral response in Latin America. 
Comparative Political Studies 37 (6):677-703. 
Easton, D. 1975. Reassessment of Concept of Political Support. British Journal of Political 
Science 5 (Oct):435-457. 
Easton, David. 1965. A framework for political analysis, Prentice-Hall contemporary 
political theory series. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall. 
Repeated Author. 1965. A systems analysis of political life. New York,: Wiley. 
Eckstein, H. 1988. A Culturalist Theory of Political-Change. American Political Science 
Review 82 (3):789-804. 
Enders, Craig K., and Davood Tofighi. 2007. Centering predictor variables in cross-sectional 
multilevel models: A new look at an old issue. Psychological Methods 12 (2):121-138. 
FreedomHouse. Electoral Democracies. Freedom House 2010 [cited 12.04.2011. Available 
from 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw10/ElectoralDemocraciesFIW2010.pdf. 
Fried, B. J., P. Lagunes, and A. Venkataramani. 2010. Corruption and Inequality at the 
Crossroad: A Multimethod Study of Bribery and Discrimination in Latin America. 
Latin American Research Review 45 (1):789-804. 
Gardiner, J. A. 2002. Defining Corruption. In Political Corruption : Concepts and Contexts, 
edited by A. J. Heidenheimer and M. Johnston. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. 
Gatti, Roberta, Stefano Paternostro, and Jamele Rigolini. 2003. Individual Attitudes toward 
Corruption: Do Social Effects Matter? SSRN eLibrary. 
Gerring, John, and Strom C. Thacker. 2004. Political Institutions and Corruption: The Role of 
Unitarism and Parliamentarism. British Journal of Political Science 34 (02):295-330. 
Goldsmith, Arthur A. 1999. Slapping the Grasping Hand. American Journal of Economics 
and Sociology 58 (4):865-883. 
Hair, Joseph F., Rolph E. Anderson, Ronald L. Tatnam, and William C. Black. 1998. 
Multivariate Data Analysis. London: Prentice-Hall International, Inc. 
87 
 
Heidenheimer, A. J., and M. Johnston. 2002. Introduction. In Political Corruption : Concepts 
and Contexts, edited by A. J. Heidenheimer and M. Johnston. New Jersey: Transaction 
Publishers. 
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2010. The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues. SSRN eLibrary. 
Kurer, Oskar. 2005. Corruption: An Alternative Approach to Its Definition and Measurement. 
Political Studies 53 (1):222-239. 
Lambsdorff, A. G. 1999. Corruption in Empirical Research - A Review. 
Lambsdorff, J. G. 2006. Measuring Corruption - The Validity and Precision of Subjective 
Indicators. In Measuring Corruption, edited by C. Sampford, A. Shacklock, C. 
Connors and F. Galtung. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishin Limited. 
Lederman, Daniel, Norman Loayza, and Rodrigo R. Soares. 2004. Accountability and 
Corruption: Political Institutions Matter. World Bank. 
Linde, Jonas, and Joakim Ekman. 2003. Satisfaction with democracy: A note on a frequently 
used indicator in comparative politics. European Journal of Political Research 42 
(3):391-408. 
Lindstedt, Catharina, and Daniel Naurin. 2006. Transparency Against Corruption. Göteborg: 
Göteborg University. 
Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1981. Political man : the social bases of politics. Expanded ed. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Manzetti, Luigi., and Carole J. Wilson. 2009. Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Public 
Support? In Corruption & Democracy in Latin America, edited by C. H. Blake and S. 
D. Morris. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Mauro, P. 1995. Corruption and Growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110 (3):681-
712. 
McCann, James A., and Jorge I. Domínguez. 1998. Mexicans react to electoral fraud and 
political corruption: an assessment of public opinion and voting behavior. Electoral 
Studies 17 (4):483-503. 
Miller, Arthur., and Ola. Listhaug. 1999. Political Performance and Institutional Trust. In 
Critical Citizens : Global Support for Democratic Governance, edited by P. Norris. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Mishler, William, and Richard Rose. 2001. What Are the Origins of Political Trust? 
Comparative Political Studies 34 (1):30-62. 
88 
 
Repeated Author. 2005. What Are the Political Consequences of Trust? Comparative 
Political Studies 38 (9):1050-1078. 
Montinola, G. R., and R. W. Jackman. 2002. Sources of corruption: A cross-country study. 
British Journal of Political Science 32:147-170. 
Morris, S. 2008. Disaggreating Corruption: A Comparison of Participation and Perceptions in 
Latin America with a Focus on Mexico. Bulletin of Latin American Research 27 
(3):388-409. 
Morris, S. D., and J. L. Klesner. 2010. Corruption and Trust: Theoretical Considerations and 
Evidence From Mexico. Comparative Political Studies 43 (10):1258-1285. 
Morris, Stephen D., and Charles H. Blake. 2009. Introduction: Political and Analytical 
Challenges of Corruption in Latin America. In Corruption & Democracy in Latin 
America, edited by C. H. Blake and S. D. Morris. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press. 
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. 2006. Corruption: Diagnosis and treatment. Journal of Democracy 17 
(3):86-99. 
Myers, Nicholas D., Ahnalee M. Brincks, and Mark R. Beauchamp. 2010. A Tutorial on 
Centering in Cross-Sectional Two-Level Models. Measurement in Physical Education 
and Exercise Science 14 (4):275-294. 
Norris, P. 1999. Introduction: The Growth of Critical Citizens? In Critical Citizens. Global 
Support for Democratic Governance., edited by P. Norris. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Nye, J. S. 1967. Corruption and Political Development - Cost-Benefit Analysis. American 
Political Science Review 61 (2):417-427. 
Olken, Benjamin A. 2009. Corruption perceptions vs. corruption reality. Journal of Public 
Economics 93 (7-8):950-964. 
Philp, Mark. 2002. Conceptualizing Political Corruption. In Political Corruption : Concepts 
and Contexts, edited by A. J. Heidenheimer and M. Johnston. New Jersey: Transaction 
Publishers. 
Repeated Author. 2006. Corruption Definitions and Measurements. In Measuring Corruption, 
edited by C. Sampford, A. Shacklock, C.Connors and F. Galtung. Farnham, Surrey: 
Ashgate Publishing Limited. 
Rabe-Hesketh, Sofia, and Anders Skrondal. 2008. Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling 
Using Stata. College Station, Texas: Stata Press. 
89 
 
Rose, R., D. C. Shin, and N. Munro. 1999. Tensions Between the Democratic Ideal and 
Reality: South Korea. In Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic 
Government., edited by P. Norris. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Rose, Richard, and William Mishler. 1996. Testing the Churchill Hypothesis: Popular 
Support for Democracy and its Alternatives. Journal of Public Policy 16 (01):29-58. 
Repeated Author. 2010. Experience versus perception of corruption: Russia as a test case. 
Global Crime 11 (2):145 - 163. 
Ruhl, J. Mark. 2011. Political Corruption in Central America: Assessment and Explanation. 
Latin American Politics and Society 53 (1):33-58. 
Sandholtz, W., and W. Koetzle. 2000. Accounting for corruption: Economic structure, 
democracy, and trade. International Studies Quarterly 44 (1):31-50. 
Seligson, M. A. 2002. The impact of corruption on regime legitimacy: A comparative study of 
four Latin American countries. Journal of Politics 64 (2):408-433. 
Repeated Author. 2006. The measurement and impact of corruption victimization: Survey 
evidence from Latin America. World Development 34 (2):381-404. 
Seligson, Mitchell A., and Elizabeth.  Zechmeister. 2010. Prologue: Background to the Study. 
In The Political Culture of Democracy, 2010. Report on the Americas., edited by M. 
A. Seligson and A. E. Smith: USAID. 
Snijders, T. A. B., and R. J. Bosker. 1999. Multilevel Analysis. An introduction to basic and 
advanced multilevel modelling. London: Sage Publications. 
Steenbergen, M. R. 2011. Multilevel Analysis of Cross-National Surveys: The Role of 
Measurement and Estimation. In RECSM Seminar: University of Bern. 
Steenbergen, M. R., and B. S. Jones. 2002. Modeling Multilevel Data Structures. American 
Journal of Political Science 46 (1):218-237. 
Strabac, Zan. 2007. Flernivåanalyse. In Kvantiativ analyse med SPSS, edited by T. A. Eikemo 
and T. H. Clausen. Trondheim: Tapir Akademiske. 
Sung, H. E. 2004. Democracy and political corruption: A cross-national comparison. Crime 
Law and Social Change 41 (2):179-194. 
Svensson, J. 2005. Eight Questions about Corruption. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 
19:19-42. 
Tanzi, Vito. 1998. Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures. 
Staff Papers - International Monetary Fund 45 (4):559-594. 
90 
 
Tavits, M. 2005. Causes of Corruption: Testing Competing Hypotheses. In Nuffield College 
Working Papers. 
Thacker, Strom C. 2009. Democracy, Economic Policy, and Political Corruption in 
Comparative Perspective. In Corruption & Democracy in Latin America, edited by C. 
H. Blake and S. D. Morris. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
TransparencyInternational. 2010. Corruption Perceptions Index 2010. Transparency 
International  
Treisman, D. 2007. What have we learned about the causes of corruption from ten years of 
cross-national empirical research? Annual Review of Political Science 10:211-244. 
Treisman, Daniel. 2000. The causes of corruption: a cross-national study. Journal of Public 
Economics 76 (3):399-457. 
Tverdova, Yuliya V. 2011. See No Evil: Heterogeneity in Public Perceptions of Corruption. 
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique 44 
(01):1-25. 
Warren, M. E. 2004. What does corruption mean in a democracy? American Journal of 
Political Science 48 (2):328-343. 
Weber, Max. 1965. Politics as a vocation, Facet books. Social ethics series. Philadelphia.: 
Fortress Press. 
Weyland, Kurt Gerhard. 1998. The Politics of Corruption in Latin America. Journal of 
Democracy 9 (2):108-121. 
You, Jong-sung, and Sanjeev Khagram. 2005. A Comparative Study of Inequality and 
Corruption. American Sociological Review 70 (1):136-157. 
 
 
  
91 
 
Appendix A: Technical information on individual country samples 
Country N Stratification Clustering Sampling Units 
Primary Sampling Units (PSU) 
Final Sampling Units (FSU) 
Estimated 
margin of 
error 
Argentina 1410 6 strata representing the six main geographical regions: 
Metropolitan area and province of Buenos Aires, Central, 
Northeastern, Northwestern, Cuyo, and Patagonia, each sub-
stratified by urban and rural areas 
Respondents were selected in clusters of 
6-8 interviews in urban areas and 10-12 in 
rural areas 
77 PSUs and 58 FSUs, including 21 of 24 
provinces in Argentina. 1248 respondents 
surveyed in urban areas, 142 in rural areas 
±2.5 
Belize 1504 6 strata representing 6 geographical areas based on the six 
districts, each sub-stratified by urban and rural arCeas 
Respondents were selected in clusters of 
8 interviews in urban areas and 12 in rural 
areas 
Sample consists of 156 sampling points 
(enumeration districts) including the 9 
municipalities (2 cities and 7 towns) and 32 
villages (out of 172 villages and communities in 
the country). 
±2.5 
Bolivia 3018 9 strata representing the departments of the country: La Paz, 
Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, Ouro, Chuiquisaca, Potosí, Pando, 
Tarija and Beni, each sub-stratified by urban and rural areas. 
Respondents were selected in clusters of 
6-8 interviews in urban areas and 10-12 in 
rural areas 
154 PSUs and 336 FSUs, including all 9 
departments. 1909 respondents surveyed in urban 
areas and 1109 in rural areas 
±1.79 
Brazil 2482 5 strata representing 5 main geographical regions: north, 
northeastern, mid-west, southeastern and south, each sub-
stratified by urban and rural areas. 
 54 PSUs and 178 FSUs, including 17 states of the 
27 of Brazil. 2135 respondents surveyed in urban 
areas, 347 in rural areas 
±1.79 
Chile 1965 9 strata representing the 3 main geographical regions: north, 
Center, and south, each sub-stratified by urban and rural areas. 
Respondnets were selected in clusters of 6-8 interviews in 
urban areas and 10-12 in rural areas 
Respondents were selected in clusters of 
6-8 interviews in urban areas and 10-12 in 
rural areas 
91 PSUs and 245 in rural areas. 1720 respondents 
surveyed in urban areas and 245 in rural areas. 
±2.21 
Colombia 1506 6 strata representing the 6 main geographical regions: Atlantic, 
Bogota, Central, Oriental, Pacific, Antiguous Terrotorios 
Nacionales,  each sub-stratified by urban and rural areas 
Respondents were selected in clusters of 
6-8 interviews in urban areas and 10-12 in 
rural areas. 
56 PSUs and 226 FSUs, including 26 of the 32 
departments of Colombia. 1110 respondents 
surveyed in urban areas and 396 in rural areas. 
±2.53 
Costa Rica 1500 5 strata representing 3 main geographical regions: metropolitan 
area, San José, the rest of the central valley and areas beyond 
the central valley, each sub-stratified by urban and rural areas. 
Respondents were selected in clusters of 
6-8 interviews in urban areas and 10-12 in 
rural areas. 
29 PSUs (cantons) and 194 FSUs, including all 7 
provinces in Costa Rica. 949 respondents 
surveyed in urban areas and 551 in rural areas. 
±2.5 
Dominican 
Republic 
1500 4 strata representing the 4 main geographical regions: Santo 
Domingo metropolitan area, north, east, and south, each sub-
Respondents were selected in clusters of 
6-8 interviews in urban areas and 10-12 in 
57 PSUs and 238 FSUs, including 31 provinces 
in the Dominican Republic. 1096 respondents 
±2.52 
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stratified by urban and rural areas. rural areas. surveyed in urban areas, and 404 in rural. 
Ecuador 3000 6 strata representing the 3 main geographical regions: coast, 
highlands, and the Amazon, each sub-stratified by urban and 
rural areas. A larger sample was drawn for the Amazon region 
because of its small population. 
Respondents were selected in clusters of 
6-8 interviews in urban areas and 10-12 in 
rural areas 
 ±1.79 
El Salvador 1550 Stratified by size of the municipalities, each sub-stratified by 
urban and rural areas. 
Respondents were selected in clusters of 
6-8 interviews in urban areas and 10-12 in 
rural areas. 
66 PSUs and 222 FSUs, including all departments 
in El Salvador. 963 respondents surveyed in 
urban areas, 587 in rural. 
±2.49 
Guatemala 1504 5 strata representing 5 main geographical regions: 
metropolitan, northeastern, southeastern, southwestern, and 
northwestern, each sub-stratified by urban and rural areas. 
Respondents were selected in clusters of 
6-8 interviews in urban areas, 10-12 in 
rural areas. 
97 PSUs (municipalities) and 194 FSUs, 
including 22 departments in Guatemala. 711 
respondents surveyed in urban areas and 793 in 
rural. 
±2.5 
Guyana 1540 7 strata representing the seven main geographical regions: the 
five coastal regions, region 10 and an area that includes regions 
1, 7, 8 and 9, each sub-stratified by urban and rural areas. 
Respondents were selected in clusters of 
6-8 interviews in urban areas and 10-12 in 
rural areas. 
54 PSUs and 261 FSUs. 456 respondents 
surveyed in urban areas and 1084 in rural areas. 
±2.5 
Honduras 1596 Stratified by regions. Sub-stratified by urban and rural Respondents were selected in clusters of 
6-8 interviews in urban areas and 10-12 in 
rural areas.  
93 PSUs and 163 FSUs, including 22 departments 
in Honduras. 720 urban 876 rural. 
±2.45 
Jamaica 1504 4 strata representing the 4 main geographical regions: Kingston 
metropolitan region, Surrey, Middlesex, Cornwall, each sub-
stratified by urban and rural areas. 
Respondents were selected in clusters of 
6-8 interviews in urban areas and 10-12 in 
rural areas. 
91 PSU and 189 FSU including all 14 parish and 
12 of the 60 constituencies of Jamaica. 784 
respondents surveyed in urban areas, 720 in rural. 
±2.53 
Mexico 1562 4 strata representing the 4 main geographical regions: north, 
Midwest, central region and south, each sub-stratified by urban 
and rural areas. 
Respondents were selected in clusters of 
12 interviews in urban and rural areas. 
130 PSUs and 130 FSUs, including 29 of the 32 
Federal States of Mexico. 1201 urban 361 rural. 
±2.48 
Nicaragua 1540 6 strata representing the 6 main geographical regions: 
Metropolitan Area, Central, North, North-Pacific, South-
Pacific and Caribbean, each sub-stratified by urban and rural 
areas. 
Respondents were selected clusters of 6-8 
interviews in urban areas and 10-12 in 
rural areas. 
43 PSUs and 164 FSUs including 17 departments 
in Nicaragua. 856 respondents surveyed in urban 
areas and 684 in rural. 
±2.5 
Panama 1536 Sample stratified by regions: metropolitan area, oriental, 
central, and occidental region, each sub-stratified by urban and 
rural areas.  
Respondents selected in clusters of 6-8 
interviews in urban areas and 10-12 in 
rural areas. 
Sample consists of 76 PSUs and 112 FSUs, 
including 10 provinces in Panama. 960 
respondents surveyed in urban areas and 576 in 
±2.5 
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*National probability sample designs of voting-age adults were employed in each country. Face-to-face interviews were in most countries conducted in Spanish. In some Spanish speaking 
countries, interviews were conducted in other languages for monolingual speakers: Bolivia (Quecha and Ayamara); Ecuador (Quicha); Guatemala (Mam, K‟iche‟, Kaqchikel, Q‟echi, Achi, 
and Ixil). In Brazil, interviews were conducted in Portuguese; in Jamaica, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago interviews were conducted in English; in Suriname Dutch and Sranan Tongo., 
Source: LAPOP (http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/core-surveys.php)  
 
 
rural. 
Paraguay 1502 6 strata representing 6 main geographical regions: Capital, 
central, department, north, central, south and east, each sub-
stratified by urban and rural areas. 
Respondents selected in clusters of 6-8 
interviews in urban areas and 10-12 in 
rural areas 
97 PSUs and 233 FSUs, including all the 18 
departments of Paraguay. 841 respondents 
surveyed in urban areas and 661 in rural. 
±2.5 
Peru 1500 7 strata representing the 5 main geographical regions: north, 
south coast, metropolitan lima, the Amazon, central, north and 
south highlands, each sub-stratified by urban and rural areas. 
Respondents selected in clusters of 6-8 
interviews in urban areas and 10-12 in 
rural areas. 
128 PSUs and 289 FSUs, including the 24 
departments and 1 constitutional province of 
Peru. 1156 surveyed in urban areas and 344 in 
rural areas 
±2.5 
Suriname 1,516 5 strata representing the 5 main geographical regions: 
pamaribo, Wanica/Para, Nickeri/Coronie/Saramancca, 
Commewijne/Marowijne, and Brokopondo/Sipaliwini, each 
sub-stratified by urban and rural areas. 
Respondents were selected in clusters of 
6-8 interviews in urban areas and 10-12 in 
rural areas. 
41 PSUs and 148 FSUs, including all 10 districts 
in Suriname. 520 respondents were surveyed in 
urban areas, 996 in rural. 
±2.5 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
1,505 5 strata representing the 5 main geographical regions: west, 
east, central, south, and Tobago, each sub-stratified by urban 
and rural areas.  
Respondents were selected in clusters of 
6-8 interviews in urban areas and 10-12 in 
rural areas. 
71 PSUs and 188 FSUs which represent 21 
departments in Trinidad & Tobago. 761 
respondents were surveyed in urban areas, 744 in 
rural. 
±2.5 
Uruguay 1,500 2 strata representing the 2 main geographical regions: 
Montevideo and Interior, each sub-stratified by urban and rural 
areas.  
Respondents were selected in clusters of 
6-8 interviews in urban areas and 10-12 in 
rural areas 
59 PSUs and 301 FSUs, including all 19 
departments in Uruguay. 1377 respondents were 
surveyed in urban areas and 123 in rural areas. 
±2.53 
Venezuela 1,500 6 strata representing the 6 main geographical regions: 
Metropolitan area (capital), Zuliana, west, mid-west, east and 
Los llanos, each sub-stratified by urban and rural areas. 
Respondents selected in clusters of 6-8 
interviews in urban areas and 10-12 in 
rural areas. 
60 PSUs and 178 FSUs, including 21 of 23 states 
in Venezuela. 1440 respondents were surveyed in 
urban areas, 60 in rural. 
±2.53 
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Appendix B: Question formulations and coding (English and 
Spanish) 
Variable Question wording Coding 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES   
Normative Support for 
Democracy 
  
 [Give the respondent card ”E”] Now we are going to use another card. The new card has a 10-point ladder, 
which goes from 1 to 10, where 1 means that you strongly disapprove and 10 means that you strongly 
approve. I am going to read you a list of some actions that people can take to achieve their political goals 
and objectives. Please tell me how strongly you would approve or disapprove of people taking the 
following actions: 
 
E5 Of people participating in legal demonstrations. How much do you approve or disapprove? Que las 
personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto abrueda o desaprueba? 
 
0=Strongly disapprove 
9=Strongly approve 
   
E8  Of people participating in an organization or group to try to solve community problems. How much do 
you approve or disapprove? Que las personas participen en una organización o un grupo para tratar de 
resolver los problemas de las comunidades. ¿Hasta qué punto abrueda o desaprueba? 
0=Strongly disapprove 
9=Strongly approve 
   
E11 Of people working for campaigns for a political party or candidate. How much do you approve or 
disapprove? Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido politico o candidato. 
¿Hasta qué punto abrueda o desaprueba? 
0=Strongly disapprove 
9=Strongly approve 
Satisfaction with Democracy   
PN4 In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the 
way democracy works in [country]? (1) Very satisfied, (2) Satisfied, (3) Dissatisfied, (4) Very dissatisfied. 
En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a) o muy insatisfecho(a) 
con la forma en que la democracia funciona en (Pais)? 
0=Very dissatisfied 
3=Very satisfied 
   
PN5 In your opinion, is [country] very democratic, somewhat democratic, not very democratic or not at all 
democratic. (1) Very democratic, (2) Somewhat democratic, (3) Not very democratic, (4) Not at all 
democratic. En su opinion, ¿(Pais) es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, 
nada democrático? 
0=Not at all democratic 
3=Very democratic 
Institutional Trust   
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 [Give card “C” to the respondent]. On this card there is a ladder with steps numbered 1 to 7, where 1 is the 
lowest step and means NOT AT ALL and 7 the highest and means A LOT. For example, if I asked you to 
what extent do you like watching television, if you don‟t like watching it at all, you would choose a score 
of 1, and if, in contrast, you like watching television a lot, you would indicate the number 7 to me. If your 
opinion is between not at all and a lot, you would choose an intermediate score. So, to what extent do you 
like watching television? Read me the number. [Make sure that the respondent understands correctly]. 
I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask you that you use the number provided in the 
ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number. 
 
   
B10a To what extent do you trust the justice system? ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de 
justicia? 
0=not at all 
6=a lot 
B11 To what extent do you trust the Supreme Electoral Tribunal? ¿Hasta qué punto usted tiene confianze en el 
(Tribunal Supremo Electoral)? 
0=not at all 
6=a lot 
B13 To what extent do you trust the National Congress? ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el 
Congreson Nacional? 
0=not at all 
6=a lot 
B21 To what extent do you trust the political parties? ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos 
politicos? 
0=not at all 
6=a lot 
B31 To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court? ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la (Corte 
Suprema de Justicia)? 
0=not at all 
6=a lot 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
  
Corruption Experience   
Police officer (EXC2) Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months? (0) No, (1) Yes. ¿Algún agente de 
policía le pidió una mordida (o soborno) en los últimos 12 meses? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
Government employee (EXC6) In the last twelve months did any government employee ask you for a bribe? (0) No, (1) Yes. ¿En los 
últimos 12 meses, algún empleado public le ha solicitado una mordida (o soborno)?  
0=No 
1=Yes 
   
Municipality (EXC11) In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipality/local government? If the 
answer is No  mark 99. If it is Yes  ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any 
kind of document like a permit, for example, did you have to pay any money beyond that required by law? 
(0) No, (1) Yes. ¿Ha tramitado algo en el municipio/delegación en los últimos 12 meses? Para tramitar 
algo en el municipio/delegación, como un permiso, por ejemplo, durante el ultimo año, ¿ha tenido que 
pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
   
Courts (EXC14) In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No  mark 99. If 
it is Yes  ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months? (0) 
No, (1) Yes. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? ¿Ha tenido que pagar una 
mordida (coima) en los juzgados en  este último año? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
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Health services (EXC15) Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? If the answer is No  mark 99. If it 
is Yes  ask the following: In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you 
have to pay a bribe? (0) No, (1) Yes. ¿Usó servicios medicos públicos (del Estado) en los últimos 12 
meses? En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida (o soborno) para ser atendido en 
un hospital o en un puesto de salud? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
School (EXC16) Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? If the answer is No  mark 99. If it is Yes  
ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months? (0) No, (1) Yes. En el 
ultimo año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? En los últimos 12 meses, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna 
mordida (o soborno)? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
Corruption Perceptions   
Public officials (EXC7) Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is (1) 
Very common, (2) Common, (3) Uncommon, or (4) Very uncommon? Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia 
o lo que ha oido mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios publicos en el país está muy generalizada, 
algo generalizada, poco generalizada, o nada generalizada? 
0=Very 
uncommon/uncommon 
1=Common 
2=Very common 
   
Government (N9) Now, using the same ladder, [continue with card C: 1-7 point scale] NOT AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A 
LOT 
To what extent would you say that the current administration combats government corruption? ¿Hasta qué 
punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno? 
0=A lot 
6=Not at all 
 
CONTROL VARIABLES   
Satisfaction with the incumbent 
government (M1) 
Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President 
[NAME CURRENT PRESIDENT]? [Read the options] (1) Very good, (2) Good, (3) Neither good nor 
bad (fair), (4) Bad, (5) Very bad. ¿Hablando en general acerca del gobierno actual, ¿diría usted que el 
trabajo que está realizando el Presidente [NOMBRE EL PRESIDENTE ACTUAL] es muy bueno, bueno, 
ni bien ni mal (regular), mal, muy mal? 
0=Very good 
4=Very bad 
   
Corruption Permissiveness 
(EXC18) 
Do you think given the way things are, sometimes paying is bribe is justified? (0) No, (1) Yes. ¿Cree que 
como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una mordida (o soborno)? 
0=No 
1=Yes 
   
Sex (Q1) [Note down; do not ask] Sex: (1) Male (2) Female  
   
Age (Q2) How old are you? ____ years  
   
Education (ED) How many years of schooling have you completed? ____ Year ____ (primary, secondary, university, post-
secondary not university) = ____ total number of years [Use the table below for the code] None (0); 
Primary (1-6); Secondary (7-12); University (13-18+); Post-secondary, not university (13-15).  
0=none/1 year 
18=18 years or more 
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Sources: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/docs/2010_Core_Questionnaire_English.pdf; http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/docs/2010_Core_Questionnaire_SPANISH.pdf  
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Appendix C: GLLAMM estimates of fixed effects models 
GLLAMM estimates of fixed effects (Model 3) in Analyses I, II, and III 
 Institutional Trust Satisfaction with Democracy Normative Support for 
Democracy 
Predictor Variables Model 3 Model 3 Model 3 
Intercept 46.936*** (1.020) 56.329*** (1.430) 71.168*** (1.365) 
Corruption experience -1.533*** (.270) -1.009*** (.287) -.469 (.270) 
Public officials somewhat corrupt -1.060* (.502) 2.263*** (.627) 2.519*** (.655) 
Public officials very corrupt -4.998*** (.673) .573 (.953) 3.580*** (.882) 
Political corruption -4.882*** (.192) -2.058*** (.141) -.284 (.174) 
Corruption Permissiveness -.902* (.396) -.571 (.484) .211 (.542) 
Incumbent Government  -4.119*** (.531) -6.673*** (.563) .023 (.330) 
Male -.048 (.287) .501 (.323) 1.428*** (.351) 
Age .031 (.026) .021 (.015) .021 (.021) 
Education -.031 (.096) -.037 (.053) .594*** (.073) 
    
Variance Components    
Individual-level  360.580 (14.770) 366.334 (11.859) 500.012 (18.637) 
Country-level 57.479 (8.596) 44.737 (16.097) 44.790 (11.657) 
-2LL -121611.71 -126359.92 -133656.97 
    
 
